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Abstract: This paper uses yearly panel data on OECD countries to analyze
the relationship between growth and the cyclicality of government debt. We
develop new time-varying estimates of the cyclicality of public debt. Our main
ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: (i) less procyclical public debt growth
can have signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on productivity growth, in particular when
ﬁnancial development is lower; (ii) public debt growth has become increasingly
countercyclical in most OECD countries over the past twenty years, but this
trend has been less pronounced in the EMU; (iii) less ﬁnancially developed or
more open economies display less countercyclical public debt growth.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A common view among macroeconomists, is that there exists a perfect di-
chotomy between macroeconomic policy (budget deﬁcit, taxation, money sup-
ply) which should aﬀect primarily the short-run, and long-run economic growth
which, if anything, should depend only upon structural characteristics of the
economy (property right enforcement, market structure, market mobility and
so forth). That macroeconomic policy should not be a key source of growth, is
further hinted at by recent contributions such as Acemoglu et al (2004) and East-
erly (2005), which argue that the correlation between macroeconomic volatility
and growth (Acemoglu et al) or those between growth and macroeconomic vari-
ables (Easterly), become insigniﬁcant once one controls for institutions.
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1In this paper we question that view by showing that, the cyclicality of public
debt growth is signiﬁcantly correlated with GDP growth, with more a counter-
cyclical public debt policy being more growth-enhancing the lower the country’s
level of ﬁnancial development. These results hold in a sample of OECD countries
with comparable institutional environments.
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold. It is ﬁrst to compute and analyze
the cyclicality of government debt on a panel of OECD countries, that is, how
government debt responds to ﬂuctuations in the output gap over time. Second,
it is to use these yearly panel data to assess the importance for growth of mov-
ing towards more countercyclical budgetary policies at various levels of ﬁnancial
development. Third, it is to investigate some determinants of the procyclicality
of public debt. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: (i) public debt
growth has become increasingly countercyclical in most OECD countries over
the past twenty years, but this trend has been signiﬁcantly less pronounced in
the EMU; (ii) less procyclical public debt growth can have signiﬁcantly pos-
itive eﬀects on growth when ﬁnancial development is lower; in particular our
estimates suggest that the eurozone could increase its annual growth rate by
0.15 percentage points per year by making its public debt growth become as
countercyclical as that in the US; (iii) less ﬁnancially developed or more open
economies display less countercyclical government debt growth.
The idea that cyclical macroeconomic policy should aﬀect productivity growth,
is more in line with the Schumpeterian view of business cycles and growth,
whereby recessions provide a cleansing mechanism for correcting organizational
ineﬃciencies and for encouraging ﬁrms to reorganize, innovate or reallocate to
new markets. The cleansing eﬀect of recessions is also to eliminate those ﬁrms
that are unable to reorganize or innovate. Now, if ﬁrms could always borrow
enough funds to either reorganize their activities or move to new activities and
markets, and the same was true for workers trying to relocate from one job to
another, the best would be to recommend that governments do not intervene
over the business cycle, and instead let markets operate.
However, suppose that the borrowing capacity of ﬁrms is proportional to
their current earnings (the factor of proportionality is what we refer to as the
credit multiplier, with a higher multiplier reﬂecting a higher degree of ﬁnan-
cial development in the economy). In a recession, current earnings are reduced,
and therefore so is the ﬁrms’ ability to borrow in order to make new innova-
tive investments or simply maintain previous innovation programs in the face
of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. This, in turn suggests that a countercyclical
budgetary policy may foster innovation and growth by reducing the negative
consequences of a recession (or a bad aggregate shock) on ﬁrms’ innovative in-
vestments. For example, the government may decide to increase the volume of its
public investments or that of public consumption, thereby fostering the demand
for private ﬁrms’ products. Or the government may choose to directly increase
its subsidies to private enterprises, thereby increasing their liquidity holdings
and thus making it easier for them to face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks without
having to sacriﬁce R&D or other types of longer-term growth-enhancing invest-
ments. A natural implication of the above argument is that the lower the level of
2ﬁnancial development, that is, the tighter the credit constraints faced by ﬁrms,
the more growth-enhancing such countercyclical policies should be, a conclusion
at odds with the dichotomous view that prevails among macroeconomists.
While we do not know of any previous attempt at analyzing the growth ef-
fects of countercyclical budgetary policies, analyses of the determinants of the
cyclicality of budgetary policies already exist in the literature. For example,
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) argue that more corrupt democracies will tend to
run more procyclical ﬁscal policy. The idea is that, in good times, voters de-
mand that the government cut taxes or provide more public services instead
of reducing debt, because they cannot observe the debt reduction and can sus-
pect the government of appropriating the rents associated with good economic
conditions. In equilibrium, this leads to a more procyclical policy as the moral
hazard problem worsens, in the sense that governments are more likely to divert
public resources in booms. They also show that this mechanism tends to be
more powerful in explaining the variation observed in the data than borrowing
constraints alone. While Alesina and Tabellini (2005) are using a large sample of
countries and explore cross-section variations, in this study we use panel analy-
sis on OECD countries. This makes the use of corruption indices impractical
for two reasons. First, there is almost no cross-sectional variation in corruption
indices within the OECD. Second, there is even less variation of these indices
across time for individual countries.
In a similar vein, Calderon et al. (2004) show that emerging market economies
with better institutions are more able to conduct a countercyclical ﬁscal pol-
icy1. Their empirical analysis is based on the International Country Risk Guide.
Although the variation in this indicator is limited across OECD countries and
time, it presents somewhat more variation than corruption indexes2.
Other papers such as Gali and Perotti (2003) and Lane (2003) focus like we
do on OECD countries. Gali and Perotti investigate whether ﬁscal policy in
the European Monetary Union (EMU) has become more procyclical after the
Maastricht treaty. They ﬁnd no evidence for such a development. They do
ﬁnd however that while there is a trend in the OECD towards a more coun-
tercyclical ﬁscal policy over time, the EMU is lagging behind that trend. Lane
(2003) is probably the paper that comes closer to the analysis developed in
the fourth section of our paper. Lane examines the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal
policy within the OECD. He then uses trade openness, output volatility, out-
put per capita, the size of the public sector and a index for political power
dispersion to examine cross-country diﬀerences in cyclicality. The reason why
1There is also the paper by Talvi and Vegh (2000), where it is argued that high output
volatility is most likely to generate a procyclical government spending. The idea is that
running a budget surplus generates political pressures to spend more: the government therefore
minimizes that surplus and becomes pro-cyclical. This movement is then accentuated by a
volatile output, and therefore a volatile tax base.
2We have also used these indicators in our analysis. However, they typically have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on GDP growth over time in our sample. Moreover, as they are less widely
available than our main variables of interest, their use considerably restricts the available
sample, leading to less precise estimates. Finally, we have therefore decided not to use these
indicators in the results reported here.
3power dispersion may play a role is taken from Lane and Tornell (1998): when
multiple political groups compete for public spending, the latter may become
more procyclical. Indeed, no group wants to let any substantial ﬁscal surplus
subsist because they are afraid that this will not lead to debt repayment but
to other groups appropriating that surplus. Lane ﬁnds in particular evidence
that GDP growth volatility, trade openness and political divisions lead to a
more procyclical spending pattern, even though the eﬀect of political divisions
is not present for all categories of spending. We contribute to this literature by
using yearly panel data to analyze the cyclicality of budgetary policies and its
determinants within OECD countries, and we show that the degree of ﬁnancial
development is an important element to explain both, cross-country and within
country variations in such policies, while future or present EMU membership
explains cross-country variations.
Most closely related to our second stage analysis of the eﬀect of countercycli-
cal budgetary policy on growth, are Aghion-Angeletos-Banerjee-Manova (2005),
henceforth AABM, and Aghion-Bacchetta-Ranciere-Rogoﬀ (2006), henceforth
ABRR. AABM develop a model to explain why macroeconomic volatility is
more negatively correlated with productivity growth, the lower ﬁnancial devel-
opment, and they test this prediction using cross-country panel data. ABRR
move from a closed real to an open monetary economy and show that a ﬁxed
nominal exchange rate regime or lower real exchange rate volatility are more
positively correlated with productivity growth, the lower ﬁnancial development
and the lower the ratio of real shocks to ﬁnancial shocks.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
the ﬁrst stage analysis of the cyclicality of public debt growth for each OECD
country and each year covered by our panel data set. In Section 3, we regress
GDP growth on ﬁnancial development, the cyclicality coeﬃcients computed in
the ﬁrst-stage regressions, and the interaction between the two. In Section 4,
we uncover some main determinants of the cyclicality of public debt. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 First stage regressions: the cyclicality of pub-
lic spending in the cross-country panel
2.1 Data
Panel data on GDP, the GDP gap (ygap), the GDP deﬂator, government gross
debt (ggﬂ), total government disbursements (ypgt), government investment
(igaa) and government consumption (cgaa), are taken from the OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook annual series3. Total government disbursements include govern-
ment investment, government consumption, debt repayment, subsidies to the
3Codes in parenthesis indicate the names of vari-
ables in the dataset. Full documentation available at
http://www.oecd.org/ﬁndDocument/0,2350,en_2649_34573_1_119669_1_1_1,00.html.
Data can be downloaded from sourceoecd.org for subscribers to that service.
4private sector, social security and other related transfers, capital transfers and
government consumption of ﬁxed capital. Note that debt and other government
data refer to general government. Financial development is measured by the
ratio of private credit to GDP, and annual cross-country data for this measure
of ﬁnancial development can be drawn from the Levine database4.I nt h i sl a t -
ter measure, private credit is all credit to private agents and therefore includes
credit to households. The average years of education in the population over 25
years old series is directly borrowed from the Barro-Lee dataset; this measure
is only available every ﬁve years and has been linearly interpolated to obtain a
yearly series. The openness variable is deﬁned as exports and imports over GDP
and data on it come from the Penn World Tables 6.1. The population growth,
government share of GDP, investment share of GDP also come from the Penn
World Tables 6.1. All nominal variables are deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator.
Summary statistics can be found in Table 1. The sample is an unbalanced panel
including the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany5, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, USA.
2.2 Rationale for the speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst stage
The baseline model for public debt growth as a function of the output gap, comes
from the tax-rate-smoothing model by Barro (1979). In this framework, deﬁcits
emerge from temporary deviations of government expenditure from “normal”
and from temporary deviations of the tax base, assumed to be represented by
real GDP, from “normal.” Since tax-rate smoothing relates to the ratio of public
debt to GDP, an interaction of the level of debt with anticipated growth of GDP
also factors into budget deﬁcits. Moreover, given the way that real deﬁcits are
usually calculated in the national accounts (corresponding to changes in nominal
debt divided by a price index), it is the growth of nominal GDP that matters.
That is, anticipated inﬂation inﬂuences the “real” deﬁcit.
We assume that the relevant tax base is proportional to real GDP, yt.W e
assume further that smoothing of the relevant marginal tax rates (for example,
on labor income or consumption or value added) corresponds to smoothing the
average tax rates, Tt/yt,w h e r eTt is real taxes collected in year t.
Let gt be real government expenditure on purchases and transfers. Suppose
that log(gt) deviates temporarily from its trend, [log(gt)]∗. Formally, the trend
should correspond to the expected present value of expenditure. In practice,
we use an H-P ﬁlter to estimate the trend in log(gt). The deviation, log(gt) −
[log(gt)]∗, is the proportionate departure of gt from normal. Multiplying by the
trend or normal value, (gt)∗, gives the amount of real debt issue required to
4Data downloadable at http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publication/CrossCountryFinStructure.zip.
5All level variables are adjusted for the German reuniﬁcation. The adjustement involves
regressing each variable of interest on time and a constant in the ten years before 1991 (data
based on West Germany only). We then use the estimated coeﬃcients to predict the values
for 1991 to 2000. We take the average ratio between actual and predicted values in the years
1991 to 2000. We use this ratio to proportionally adjust values before 1991.
5ﬁnance temporary expenditure (rather than having temporarily high tax rates).
Suppose that log(yt) deviates temporarily from its trend, [log(yt)]∗.Ap o s -
itive value corresponds to a boom and a negative one to a recession. Again,
we use an H-P ﬁlter (or, alternatively, measures of capacity output) to cal-
culate [log(yt)]∗. Given the behavior of gt, tax-rate smoothing implies that a
temporary excess of log(yt) from [log(yt)]∗ calls for an equi-proportionate ex-
cess of real taxes, Tt, from normal. Normal real taxes correspond to normal or
trend expenditure, (gt)∗. Therefore, the product of log(yt)−[log(yt)]∗ and (gt)∗
gives the budget surplus (corresponding to a temporarily high level of real taxes
collected) associated with a boom.
Given log(gt) − [log(gt)]∗ and log(yt) − [log(yt)]∗, tax-rate smoothing calls
for expanding the level of real debt, bt, along with expansions of real GDP,
yt.T h a ti s ,i flog(gt)=[ log(gt)]∗ and log(yt)=[ log(yt)]∗, the debt-GDP ratio
should stay constant. Therefore, the change in the real debt, bt −bt−1, includes
at e r mγbt−1,w h e r eγ is the (trend) growth rate of real GDP.
The national accounts typically measure the real budget deﬁcit as the real
value of the change in the nominal debt (because nominal government expen-
diture includes interest payments computed from the nominal interest rate).
When measured this way, tax-rate smoothing implies that the real budget deﬁcit
includes another term, πbt−1,w h e r eπ is the (expected) inﬂation rate. That is,
the measured real budget deﬁcit depends on the overall term (γ+π)bt−1,w h e r e
γ + π is the growth rate of nominal GDP.
The term (γ + π)bt−1 should move closely with the real value of nominal
interest payments. The diﬀerence is that nominal interest payments depend on
the real interest rate, r, rather than the growth rate of real GDP, γ.I f w e
generate a dependent variable by subtracting the real value of nominal interest
payments from the measured real budget deﬁcit, the coeﬃcient on the variable
bt−1 on the right-hand side should be γ −r, which we treat as a constant. This
constant would be negative in the standard deterministic model. (However,
with uncertainty, the real rate r on government debt could be smaller than γ,
t h em e a ng r o w t hr a t eo fr e a lG D P . )
The baseline tax-smoothing model has no tendency for the debt-GDP ratio
to revert to a stationary mean, such as zero. (More generally, the ratio might
revert to something positive, possibly dependent on other assets held by the
government.) If there were a tendency for the debt-GDP ratio to revert toward
zero, we might pick up this eﬀect from the coeﬃcient on the stock of real debt,
bt−1. Thus, a negative coeﬃcient on bt−1 could represent this mean reversion,
along with the eﬀect γ − r already mentioned.
Our empirical counterpart of the tax-rate smoothing model of budget deﬁcits
is then for each country i:












+ a4it + εit
where εit ∼ N(0,σ2
ε).
Empirically, the variables are deﬁned as follows:
• bit : gross government debt in country i at year t
• yit :t h eG D Pi nc o u n t r yi and year t
• ygap,it : the GDP gap in country i and year t as computed by the OECD
based on a production function approach.
• iit : interest payments made by the government in country i and year t
• git : total government disbursements in country i and year t
• εit : error term
The a coeﬃcients to be estimated are for the purpose of this paper, as-
sumed to be potentially time-varying, which is why we write ajit to denote the
coeﬃcient on the variable j in country i at time t.
A bar above a variable indicates that one takes the prediction for this vari-
able using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. A lambda parameter of 25 was chosen,
following OECD(1995). The prediction was then computed separately for each
country.
Note that bit −bi,t−1 is exactly equal to the opposite of the budget balance,
so that our left-hand side variable is very close to the opposite of the budget
b a l a n c ea sas h a r eo fG D P .
With tax smoothing, the predicted coeﬃcients are a1it = −1 and a2it =1 .
The coeﬃcient a3it corresponds, as discussed, to γ −r (plus a possible negative
eﬀect associated with reversion of the debt-GDP ratio toward zero or some other
positive target value).
Even if a government does not precisely pursue tax-rate smoothing, the
f o r m u l a t i o ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 )i su s e f u lin the sense that the deviations of the
estimated coeﬃcients a from the values prescribed under tax smoothing are
informative. For example, if a1it < −1, the government is pursuing a more
counter-cyclical deﬁcit policy than called for by tax smoothing, and vice versa
if a1it > −1. A procyclical deﬁcit policy, a1it > 0, is very far from tax-rate
smoothing; that is, a1it =0is not the natural baseline. We also examine how
the extent of counter-cyclical deﬁcit policy varies over time within countries, as
well as across countries.
7Finally, when brieﬂy analyzing the cyclicality of government investment or
consumption6, we just replace government gross debt by these on the left-hand
side of equation 1; in such speciﬁcations, government interest payments are not
subtracted on the left-hand side.
2.3 Econometric methods
Regression based approaches to measure the cyclicality of ﬁscal policies are now
common in the literature and can be found for example in Lane (2003) and
Alesina and Tabellini (2005). However, the methods used in these papers give
rise to only one observation of cyclicality per country. In order to make full
use of the panel structure of our data, we compute instead for each country
yearly measures for the cyclicality of diﬀerent categories of public spending. A
ﬁrst method, which we do not emphasize in the text, estimates time-varying
coeﬃcients by using 10-years rolling window ordinary least squares estimates,
a straightforward but very noisy and therefore less reliable method. The sec-
ond method uses local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares estimates (also
called kernel-based nonparametric regression or local smoothing): for each year,
points that are closer in time are given more weight than points that are further
away. The third method is to compute time-varying coeﬃcients in the above
equation 1 under the assumption that these coeﬃcients follow an AR(1) process.
Consider ﬁrst the ten-year rolling window OLS method: if viτ denotes the
value of the budgetary variable under consideration (growth of government debt,
government investment, or government consumption as deﬁn e da b o v e )i nc o u n -
try i and year τ, then the method simply amounts to estimating the procycli-
cality of that variable at year t in country i by running the following regression










+ a4it + εiτ,
for τ ∈ (t − 5,t+4 ) .
that is, one uses a ten year centered rolling window to estimate the pro-cyclicality
of the budgetary variable at any date t.T h i sm e t h o ds u ﬀers however from se-
rious shortcomings. First, by deﬁnition, we lose the ﬁrst ﬁve years and the last
four years of data for each country. Second, because the method involves esti-
mating a coeﬃcient by discarding at each time period one old observation and
taking into account a new one, the coeﬃcient can vary substantially when the
new observation is very diﬀerent from the one it replaces. This implies that the
series may be jagged and aﬀected by noise and transitory changes; moreover, a
sudden jump in the series would not be coming from changes in the immediate
neighborhood of date t, but from changes 5 years before and 4 years after. To
6In the remainder of the paper, we will often loosely talk about procyclicality or cyclicality
of public debt, investment or consumption. All these terms always refer to the a1 coeﬃcient
in equation 1 when estimated with a left-hand side variable based on either debt, investment
or consumption.
8avoid these problems we decided instead to implement two alternative methods
for our ﬁrst stage estimations.
The ﬁrst method we use is local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares.
The method is very similar in spirit to the 10-years rolling window. But, instead
of taking only ten observations at a time, we take all the observations and we
weigh them by a Gaussian centered at date t. Again the regressions are run










+ a4it + εiτ,












In practice, we use σ =5 . The choice was made to obtain suﬃcient smoothing of
the estimates. While there is some arbitrariness in this choice, choosing 10 years
rather than 8 or 12 is just as arbitrary in the case of the 10-years rolling window
method. By contrast with the latter method, weighed regressions allow us to
use all the data points for our estimates. Moreover, under this method, jumps
in the coeﬃcients are mainly due to changes in the immediate neighborhood of
date t, as those observations in the immediate neighborhood of date t are given
highest weight.
The second and preferred method, assumes that coeﬃcients, instead of being
independant over time as in ordinary least squares regressions, follow an AR(1)
process, namely, using the notation from equation 1, for each country i and for
each coeﬃcient j:






The main challenge in this case is to estimate σ2
aj (the variance of the co-
eﬃcient) at the same time as the variance of the observation, i.e. the vari-
ance σ2
ε in the formulation of equation 1. Once these variances are estimated,
applying the Kalman smoother gives the best estimates for ajit. These equa-
tions can be estimated separately for each country using the VC (for varying
coeﬃcients) program by Ekkehart Schlicht7. This program uses a method to
estimate variances that gives estimates asymptotically equivalent to maximum
likelihood estimates8. The optimal solution is hard to compute as it involves
7The program and its documentation are downloadable from:
http://www.semverteilung.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/mitarbeiter/frameset_es.htm.
8Because of the similarity to a maximum likelihood method such as the EM (Expectation-
Maximization) algorithm, this program runs into the local maximum problem. That is, it is
in some cases possible to maximize likelihood by assuming that the variance is zero. While
this is indeed a solution to the problem, it is only a local maximum. In this paper, we are
seeking estimates that show the variation in time of the policy variables of interest. This
technical problem is then also a conceptual problem: we do not believe a variance of zero
to be a reasonable solution, as it implies time-invariant estimates. It is possible to use an
approximate method that mitigates this problem using the Schlicht program, and we have
done so in a previous version of the paper.
9Bayesian inference in a complicated hierarchical model. While ﬁnding analyt-
ical closed form solutions turns out to be virtually impossible, Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods provide a feasible numerical approximation. We
implement the method in Matlab, assuming, in a panel-like fashion, that the
variances of the coeﬃcients and equations are the same for all countries. We
are thus left with ﬁve variances to estimate: four for the coeﬃcient processes
(σ2
aj,j =1 ,2,3,4) and one for the variance of the error in the equation (σ2
ε).
Intuitively, the MCMC method explores randomly (using a Markov chain, hence
t h en a m e )aw i d es p e c t r u mo fp o s s i b l ev alues for the variances, and one then
retains a set that is representative of probable values given the data. In prac-
tice, the estimates obtained using this method are highly correlated with the
modiﬁed Schlicht method used in a previous version of this paper. The advan-
tage of the MCMC method is that it does not get stuck in local solutions and
properly represents uncertainty about the variances. The results obtained from
this technique9 thus do not suﬀer from the usual overﬁtting problems and the
data analysis becomes more meaningful.
The three estimation methods for the ﬁrst stage entail diﬀerent statistical
properties and underlying assumptions about the processes at play. From a
statistical point of view, the rolling window method relies on less data than the
local Gaussian-weighted OLS and AR(1) approaches. The last two approaches
are more reliable because they use the whole available data to estimate the
coeﬃcients and they proceed in a more structured way.
The diﬀerence between the diﬀerent estimation methods is meaningful from
an economic point of view. Indeed, with the AR(1) method, it is assumed
that the cyclicality of public spending only changes slowly over time and al-
ways follows the same underlying laws as deﬁned by the estimated variances
of the coeﬃcients. By contrast, in the case of the rolling window approach, a
sudden substantial change in the cyclicality of public spending is not ruled out.
Moreover, no persistence of underlying parameters is assumed in the long run:
indeed, the coeﬃcient estimated, say 15 years after the start of the data series
uses a completely diﬀerent set of observations from the coeﬃcient estimated 5
years after the start of the data series. The Gaussian-weighted OLS lies be-
tween the AR(1) and the 10-years rolling window methods: on the one hand,
it does not directly assume any persistence of the coeﬃcient so that the latter
is allowed to change in an unconstrained way; on the other hand, the wider the
Gaussian used for weighing observations, the smoother the coeﬃcient estimates
over time. Thus, ”small” changes (or noise) are smoothed out, but yet ”big”
changes remain visible, the meaning of big and small depending on the width
of the Gaussian.
Overall, we believe that the assumptions underlying the Gaussian-weighted
OLS and the AR(1) model are more reasonable than the OLS rolling window
both from a statistical and economic perspective, hence our choice to emphasize
Gaussian-weighted OLS and AR(1) results in the text, while the 10-years rolling
window results are relegated in the appendix 3. Appendix 2 shows the results
9See the technical appendix for more details on the implementation of this method.
10from the procyclicality estimations with all three methods.
2.4 Results
We now use the Gaussian-weighted OLS and AR(1) methods to characterize
the level and time path of the procyclicality of government debt in the OECD
countries in our sample.
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our main variables of interest.
It is worth noting that the three diﬀerent methods used in the ﬁrst stage to
estimate procyclicality give very similar results. We note that gross debt is
countercyclical (negative coeﬃcient) while public consumption and investment
are procyclical (positive coeﬃcient). These ﬁndings are consistent with Lane
(2003), who ﬁnds that government investment and consumption are procyclical,
and that the primary surplus is procyclical, which in turn is equivalent to saying
that government debt is countercyclical. Moreover, the mean of our gross debt
procyclicality estimate is very close to -1 for all methods considered, which is in
line with the tax smoothing model described above.
TABLE 1 HERE
We now look at the evolution of the procyclicality of public debt growth,
as measured by the estimated coeﬃcients a1it from equation 1. Figure 1 shows
the evolution of the procyclicality of debt for the US estimated by the three
methods described above. We can readily see that, as expected, the 10 years
rolling window yields most volatile results, and the AR(1) method the smoothest
with the Gaussian-weighted OLS method lying in between. Overall, all three
methods show a decrease in procyclicality over time, with a recent trend towards
increasing procyclicality shown by the 10 years rolling window and Gaussian-
weighted OLS methods.
FIGURE 1 HERE
In Figure 2, we then show the procyclicality of public debt estimated through
the AR(1) method for a few countries in our sample . In general, and in line with
US trends, procyclicality tends to diminish over time, especially since the 1980’s.
This downward trend in procyclicality is however more pronounced for the UK
and the US than for the average of EMU countries. Also, one can observe
some divergence between EMU and non-EMU countries: at the beginning of
the period, the procylicality of public debt growth in EMU countries was very
similar to that in the US or the UK, however, as of the 1990’s, the US and the
UK became signiﬁcantly more countercyclical whereas the EMU did not.
FIGURE 2 HERE
In Figure 3, we plot the same evolution, however based on coeﬃcients that
are estimated using the Gaussian-weighted OLS. As can be seen, trends in esti-
mates are very similar to those obtained using the AR(1) method.
11FIGURE 3 HERE
These results are consistent with Gali and Perotti (2003), who show, splitting
their sample by decades, that in general ﬁscal deﬁcits in the OECD have become
more countercyclical, but less so in EMU countries. Here, we conﬁrm these
results using a full-ﬂedged time-series measure of cyclicality.
To summarize our results from ﬁrst stage regressions, we found that gov-
ernment debt has become more countercyclical in non-EMU countries than in
EMU countries since the 1990s.
3 Second stage regressions: the eﬀect of coun-
tercyclical budgetary policies on growth
In this section we regress growth on the cyclicality coeﬃcients derived for each
budgetary variable in the ﬁrst stage regressions of the previous section, ﬁnancial
development, the interaction between the two variables, and a set of controls.
Our conjecture is that the more ﬁrms are credit constrained, that is, the lower
ﬁnancial development, the more growth-enhancing countercyclical budgetary
policies should be to the extent that they reduce the costs that negative liquidity
shocks impose on credit-constrained ﬁrms. The underlying idea, modelled by
AABM, is that, in an economy with tight credit constraints, the occurrence of
a recession forces a number of ﬁrms to cut on innovative investments in order
to survive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
To reduce the negative consequences of a recession (or a bad aggregate shock)
on ﬁrms’ innovative investments, the government may decide to increase the vol-
ume of its public investments, or public consumption, or to subsidize consumer
credit in order to foster the demand for private ﬁrms’ products. Alternatively,
the government may choose to directly increase its subsidies to private enter-
prises, thereby increasing their liquidity holdings and thus making it easier for
them to face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks without having to sacriﬁce R&D or
other types of longer-term growth-enhancing investments. However, this may
have the perverse eﬀect of softening ﬁrms’ budget constraints, thereby partly
undermining the potential innovation-enhancing eﬀect of recessions.
That government intervention might increase aggregate eﬃciency in an econ-
omy subject to credit constraints and aggregate shocks, has already been pointed
out by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Our analysis in this section can be seen
as a ﬁrst attempt to explore potential empirical implications of this idea for the
relationship between growth and public spending over the cycle.
3.1 Theoretical background
The following toy model is directly adapted from AABM and ABRR. Consider
an economy composed of a continuum of ﬁrms, each of which lives for two
periods. A ﬁrm born at date t produces at that date according to
yt = at,
12where at denotes the knowledge adjusted level of aggregate productivity. At the
beginning of date t, the ﬁrm can also invest in R&D. Investing R&D eﬀort 1
2z2,
allows the ﬁrm innovate in period (t +1 )with probability z, provided the ﬁrm
overcomes an idiosyncratic liquidity shock occurring at the end of period t. For
simplicity, suppose that the liquidity shock e c is independently and identically
distributed across ﬁrms with uniform distribution over the interval [0,1], whereas
the aggregate shock at over time is distributed according to
at =
½
1+ε with probability 1/2
1 − ε with probability 1/2
.
The long-term R&D investment yields a (knowledge-adjusted) value equal
to ν>0 in period (t +1 )whenever innovation is successful. The investment
decision is made before the realization of the aggregate shock at. Finally, credit
market imperfections prevent a ﬁrm with short-run proﬁt ﬂow a to invest more
than µa, where 1 <µ<∞, for the purpose of covering its idiosyncratic liquidity
cost e c.
Before aggregate productivity at is realized, ﬁrms will choose to invest in
R&D the amount of eﬀort





V = ν.Et(min[1,µa t]),
with Et denoting to the expected value at date t, and where
min[1,µa t]=P r ( e c ≤ µat)
is the probability of the ﬁrm overcoming its liquidity shock in period t condi-
tional upon at.
One can easily show that a mean-preserving spread of at will reduce V and
therefore the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in R&D as it will reduce the expected
probability of overcoming the liquidity shock. It will thus also reduce more the
expected growth rate which we take to be equal to the expected innovation ﬂow:
gt = z∗Et(min[1,µa t]) = ν{Et(min[1,µa t])}2.
A countercyclical public debt policy that consists in taxing individuals when
at =1+ε in order reduce the incidence of a low at =1+ε on ﬁrms’ short term
proﬁts, should then be growth-enhancing, and all the more so when µ is lower.
3.2 Empirical speciﬁcations
In all the speciﬁcations we use for our second-stage regressions, we measure
productivity growth by the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of real GDP per capita.
We shall regress this left hand side variable on the lagged cyclicality of public
debt growth as derived in the ﬁrst stage regressions, the lagged private credit
13measure captured by the ratio of private credit to GDP and borrowed from
Levine (2001), and the interaction between those two variables. As control
variables, we use the lag of log real GDP per capita, the level of schooling,
openness to trade, inﬂation10, population growth, and the government share
of total GDP. Moreover, in all speciﬁcations and unless otherwise speciﬁed, we
weigh each observation by the inverse of the variance of the estimated cyclicality
coeﬃcient (aweights in Stata), thus giving higher weight to coeﬃcients that are
more precisely estimated in the ﬁrst stage.
Each of the tables we present here are structured as follows. Using the set
of cyclicality measures derived in the ﬁrst stage respectively from the Gaussian-
weighted least squares and AR(1) methods, we ﬁrst perform ordinary least
squares regressions (ﬁrst column). We then move on to country ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates (second column). As is typical in panel growth regressions and can
be conﬁrmed by the Wooldridge test implemented in Stata’s xtserial command,
the errors are serially correlated (AR(1)) in ﬁrst diﬀerences11. This implies
that country ﬁxed eﬀect estimates may be biased. To correct for this potential
source of bias, we use Stata’s xtregar command, which implements the method
described in Batalgi (2001) to estimate the coeﬃcient of correlation between the
errors and give unbiased estimates (third column). Xtregar allows the use of
weights12, but the weights can only be country speciﬁc and not observation spe-
ciﬁc13. We therefore weigh observations by the inverse of the average variance of
ﬁrst-stage estimates for each country. Lastly, we include year ﬁxed eﬀects on top
of country ﬁxed eﬀects and estimate these speciﬁcations, respectively without
and with correction for AR(1) in the error term (fourth and ﬁfth columns).
3.3 Results
Table 2 shows the results of regressing the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of real
GDP per capita over the lagged cyclicality of government debt, measured by
the coeﬃcients obtained in the ﬁrst stage regression using the AR(1) method.
The prediction is that of a negative coeﬃcient for the eﬀect on growth of the
procyclicality of public debt, and of a positive coeﬃcient on procyclicality inter-
acted with ﬁnancial development, and we see that the corresponding coeﬃcients
in Table 2 always have the desired signs.
However, it is only when we control for country or country year ﬁxed eﬀects
that the results become signiﬁcant and they are indeed signiﬁcant at the 5% or
10While we do not directly address monetary policy in this work, controlling for inﬂation
allows to indirectly take into account the eﬀect of monetary policy on growth.
11This is true whether or not we include the lagged dependant variable, i.e. lag of log real
GDP per capita.
12In principle, GMM Arellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond estimates could also usefully address
this problem. In practice, these methods as implemented with Stata do not allow for weights,
which makes them considerably less useful in the context of this paper. We did however try to
use these methods without weights, but they never passed essential speciﬁcation tests, which
is one further reason not to rely on them in this speciﬁcc a s e .
13Moreover, the use of weights restricts the range of methods available to calculate the
coeﬃcient of the AR(1) process in the errors. We chose the ”regress” method here.
14even at the 1% level. The magnitude of coeﬃcients also increases when adding
country ﬁxed eﬀects as compared to OLS. In the last two columns, the further
addition of year eﬀects slightly decreses the magnitude of the coeﬃcients and
their signiﬁcance. Allowing for an AR(1) structure in the error term in columns
3 and 5 does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results.
Table 2 is thus consistent with the prediction of a negative eﬀect of pro-
cyclicality in public debt on growth, whereas we see a positive and signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀect between private credit and the procyclicality variable. Thus
the less ﬁnancially developed a country is, the more growth-enhancing it is for
the government to be countercyclical in its debt policy.
TABLE 2 HERE
Table 3 below repeats the same exercises as in Table 2 but now the lagged
cyclicality of public debt measures are those derived from ﬁrst-stage regressions
using the Gaussian-weighted least squares method. Results are very similar in
magnitude and signiﬁcance to the ones presented in Table 2. The only noticeable
diﬀerence is that the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between procyclicality
of public debt and private credit over GDP is smaller and no longer signiﬁcant
when adding both country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. This might be due to the
Gaussian weighted method being noisier than the AR(1) method, a presumption
which is reinforced by the fact that moving from the Gaussian to the even noisier
10-year OLS rolling window method removes the signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients,
as shown in Table 1 in the Appendix 3. However, it must be noted that part of
this loss of signiﬁcance is due to a higher sensitivity of results to the inclusion of
the lagged depedant variable (that is lag(log(real GDP per capita)) in the case of
the 10-years rolling window method. This arises because there non negligeable
correlation between lagged private credit over GDP, lagged log of GDP per
capita and the cyclicality measure, implying that including the lagged depedant
variable worsens multicolinearity problems. In Table 2 of Appendix 3, we thus
repeat the same exercise as in Table 1 of Appendix 3, and ﬁnd that results are
more often signiﬁcant when excluding the lagged dependant variable. Results
are now signiﬁcant for both the main term and the interaction with country
ﬁxed eﬀects, and remain signiﬁcant for the interaction when including year
ﬁxed eﬀects while the main eﬀect is then only signiﬁcant at 22%. It is still the
case however that the signiﬁcance disappears when accounting for the AR(1)
structure in the error term in columns 3 and 5. Even with the 10 years rolling
window method, a cruder and noisier estimation procedure, we thus ﬁnd some
evidence that less countercyclical public debt policy is harmful for economic
growth, and even more so when ﬁnancial development is lower.
TABLE 3 HERE
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the eﬀects of public debt cyclicality
on growth and the interaction of these eﬀects with ﬁnancial development, we
can ask the following question: according to our estimates, what would happen
if public debt in the EMU became as countercyclical as that in the US? Table
154 summarizes the answer to this question, which is based on the estimates in
columns 5 of Tables 2 and 3, that is on the most demanding speciﬁcation with
both country and year ﬁxed eﬀects and correction for an AR(1) structure in the
error term. Thus, if the EMU’s government debt was to become as countercycli-
cal as that in the US, which corresponds to a reduction in procyclicality equal
to 1.18 units, then the EMU would gain 0.72 points of growth if using the AR(1)
method (Panel A) and 0.84 points of growth when using the Gaussian-weighted
OLS method (Panel B). By contrast, if the US was to reduce its procyclicality
by the same 1.18 units, it would grow less by up to 5.7 points (Panel A).
TABLE 4 HERE
N e x t ,w ei n v e s t i g a t ew h e t h e rt h e s er e s ults are driven more by government
investments, or by government consumption. This part of our analysis is highly
tentative and exploratory, and in particular it relies on the ad hoc assumption
that the cyclicality of the various components of public spending would respond
to the same right hand side variables as the growth of public debt and according
to the same kind of equation. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the analysis
for respectively public consumption and investment using the AR(1) MCMC
method. Results are broadly insigniﬁcant for public consumption (Table 5),
while for public investment (Table 6) they are similar to those found for public
debt. However, a procyclical public investment seems to be signiﬁcantly dimin-
ishing growth irrespective of the level of ﬁnancial development, as the interaction
between the procyclicality of public investment and private credit over GDP is
typically insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, when using the Gaussian-weighted
rolling window for the second stage (Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 3) we ﬁnd the
results for public consumption to be more similar to those for public debt than
the results for public investment. We therefore conclude that there is some
evidence that procyclical public investment and consumption are harmful for
growth, and possibly even more so when a country is less ﬁnancially developed.
However, these results are more tentative and sensitive to the ﬁrst-stage meth-
ods and speciﬁcations used than in the case of public debt. Part of the reason
for less clear-cut results might be stemming from the fact that it is inadequate
to use the same ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcation for public consumption and investment
as for public debt.
TABLE 5, 6 HERE
One interesting conclusion from the above analysis, is that EMU countries
should have public debt policies that are more countercyclical, or at least as
countercyclical, than in the US. On the other hand, the US are more ﬁnancially
developed than the EU (the ratio of private credit to GDP in 2000 in the EU is
equal 0.92 against 2.17 in the US, and this diﬀerence abstracts from diﬀerences in
stock market and venture capital market development), and therefore one might
wonder whether growth in the US might actually beneﬁt from a reduction in
the countercyclicality of public debt policy. Our regressions in Tables 2 and 3
and our calculations in Table 4 suggest that this might indeed be the case: since
16the US decrease growth by getting more countercyclical, the linear speciﬁcation
used in our model implies that at their level of ﬁnancial development they could
increase growth by becoming less countercyclical.
Finally, these conclusions raise the issue of whether or to which extent indi-
vidual countries can control the degree of public debt countercyclicality. Part
of the answer may involve the cost at which governments can borrow from do-
mestic or foreign capital markets, and whether this cost is itself procyclical or
countercyclical. This brings us to the following section on the determinants of
the cyclicality of public debt.
4 Determinants of the cyclicality of public debt
We now investigate possible explanations for the observed diﬀerences in the
procyclicality of public debt policy across countries in our sample and over
time. Since our sample is restricted to OECD countries, little variation should
be expected from the corruption or other institutional variables considered by
the literature so far14. Instead, we will focus on potential explanatory variables
such as ﬁnancial development or openness, that may aﬀect governments’ ability
to borrow over the cycle or the cost for them to do so. We also include GDP
growth volatility as measured by the standard error of GDP growth, lag of log
real GDP per capita, the government share of GDP, and EMU membership15 as
control variables. Financial development is a plausible suspect as it inﬂuences
both the ability and the willingness of governments to borrow. While OECD
countries are arguably less subject to borrowing constraints than other countries
in the world, there is still a fair amount of cross-country variation in ﬁnancial
development among OECD countries. Openness is also a plausible candidate as
one can expect a higher capital inﬂow in more open economies during expansion
periods, and therefore a lower cost of capital during such periods. This in
turn tends to increase the long-run cost of ﬁnancing countercyclical public debt
policies while maintaining the overall debt constant on average over the long
run. The EMU dummy is also a plausible candidate, given: (i) our casual
observation in the introduction to the eﬀect that the structural deﬁcit appears
to be less reactive to the business cycle in the eurozone than in the US or the
UK; (ii) the deﬁcit and debt restrictions imposed by the Stability and Growth
Pact and also the restrictions that individual countries imposed themselves in
order to qualify for EMU membership.
Table 7, where the cyclicality measures are derived using the AR(1) and
Gaussian-weighted methods, shows results that are consistent with these con-
jectures, namely: (i) higher ﬁnancial development is positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the countercyclicality of government debt (the table shows a neg-
14As mentioned above, using ICRG indicators turns out not to be of interest for our analysis.
15This dummy variable takes a value of 1 for all countries that currently belong to the EMU,
and 0 for all the other countries. This is because the EMU has been prepared for many years
so that the countries that would eventually join might be diﬀerent even before the EMU is
fully eﬀective.
17ative coeﬃcient of public debt procyclicality); in other words, it is precisely when
the countercyclicality of public debt is more positively correlated with growth,
namely when ﬁnancial development is low, that public debt countercyclicality
seems hardest to achieve; (ii) more trade openness is negatively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with public debt countercyclicality (the table shows a positive cor-
relation between openness and public debt procyclicality); (iii) EMU countries
appear to have a harder time achieving public debt countercyclicality. The eﬀect
of the EMU dummy is more likely to be explained by rigidities already imposed
by the precursor EMS regime and then reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty,
rather than the 1999 implementation of the EMU itself16; further investigation
of this question is however beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, we note that
higher volatility of GDP growth and a higher share of government in the GDP
are associated with a more countercyclical debt policy.
TABLE 7 HERE
To summarize our discussion in this section, a lower level of ﬁnancial devel-
opment, a higher degree of openness, and belonging to the EMU group, enter
signiﬁcantly as explanatory variables to explain a lower degree of countercycli-
cality in government debt.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have analyzed the dynamics and determinants of the cyclicality
of public debt on a yearly panel of OECD countries, and we have analyzed
the relationship between public debt countercyclicality, ﬁnancial development,
and productivity growth. Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: ﬁrst,
countercyclicality has increased over time across all countries in our sample,
however to a lower extent in EMU countries than in the US or the UK. Second,
countercyclicality of government debt appears to be facilitated by a higher level
of ﬁnancial development while it appears to be complicated by a higher degree
of openness to trade. Third, our main ﬁnding is that countercyclical public
debt policy is more growth enhancing the lower the country’s level of ﬁnancial
development.
Our analysis may be criticized on several grounds. First, one might dispute
the causal link from public debt countercyclicality to growth, arguing that our
second stage regressions simply reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a tg r o w t ha l l o w sac o u n t r y
to become more countercyclical. Without ruling out the existence of a reverse
causality from growth to public debt policy over the cycle, and in the absence of
a good experiment or instrument, the case can still be made to support the claim
that reverse causality is not plaguing our main results. First, if all there is, is
that countries with higher average growth can aﬀord to be more countercyclical,
then country ﬁxed eﬀects would account for this. Second, we use lagged and
16We have thus experimented with an interaction between the EMU dummy and a post-1999
dummy, but this interaction was typically insigniﬁcant, indicating that there is no substantial
change occuring with the full implementation of the EMU in 1999.
18not current policy cyclicality; in fact, we can show that future cyclicality is not
signiﬁcantly correlated with growth whereas past cyclicality is so correlated at
several lags, thereby further supporting the idea that cyclicality Granger-causes
growth and not the reverse.
More generally, we have an endogeneity problem if unobserved determinants
of cyclicality or ﬁnancial development also inﬂuence growth. If these deter-
minants are country-speciﬁc and time-invariant, once again the inclusion of
country ﬁxed-eﬀects cure it. Moreover, year ﬁxed eﬀect account for unobserved
determinants that are time-varying and common to all countries. Thus, the
endogeneity problem only arises with time-variant country-speciﬁc factors that
are unobserved or uncontrolled for. What our analysis suggests is that openness
cannot be such a factor, as higher openness is negatively correlated with public
debt countercyclicality whereas it is positively correlated with growth.
Another potential problem arises from the fact that because GDP growth
and GDP gap are positively correlated, the eﬀect of procyclicality (estimated co-
eﬃcient on GDP gap) on growth will mechanically tend to be negative, creating
a spurious negative correlation between procyclicality and growth automatically
by construction. However, we use the lagged value of procyclicality and, while
current growth and GDP gap are indeed positively correlated, current growth
and the lagged GDP gap are uncorrelated17.
Finally, in light of our second stage regressions, one may wonder whether
the EMU should really change its policy given that ﬁnancial development is in-
creasing in the EMU over time, boosted by the monetary union itself. However,
based on the historical growth trend of ﬁnancial development, the EMU will
not reach the current level of ﬁnancial development of the USA until year 2084.
E v e nb a s e do nt h ef a s t e rg r o w t ht r e n do fﬁnancial development of the 1990’s,
the EMU will only reach the USA level of ﬁnancial development in 2068. On the
other hand the USA, according to our estimates, might be too countercyclical.
In order for more countercyclicality to be no longer growth enhancing for the
EMU, and based on growth trend of ﬁnancial development of the 1990’s, the
EMU would still have to wait for several decades (at least until between 2020
and 2030, depending on which speciﬁcation we base our estimates on).
We now conclude by mentioning some possible research avenues. First, one
could try to perform the same kind of analysis for other groups of countries,
e.g middle income countries in Latin America or in Central and Eastern Eu-
17While this makes us fairly conﬁdent in our results, it does not completely rule out some
degree of spurious correlation between GDP growth and procyclicality. Indeed, by construction
our ﬁrst stage estimates of procyclicality do not rely only on the curret value of the right-hand
side variables (including GDP gap). In the Gaussian weighted OLS method, current GDP gap
is however given more weight than future or past GDP gaps, so lagged procylicality depends
more on lagged than current GDP gap. In the AR(1) method, by the AR(1) assumption the
value of the current cyclicality coeﬃcient depends only on the past value of the cyclicality
coeﬃcient and not on future values. Thus lagged cyclicality depends primarily on lagged GDP
gap and even further lags of the GDP gap, and not on the current GDP gap. The use of the
Kalman smoother does however introduce some small degree of feedback between future and
past values of the coeﬃcient. However, all in all, the AR(1) method should be resistant to
the bias arising from spurious correlation.
19rope. Second, one could explore potential implications of the relationship be-
tween growth and the countercyclicality of budgetary policy for the conduct
of monetary policy. For example, to which extent allowing for some inﬂation
or for higher procyclicality of short term interest rates, increases governments’
borrowing costs during recessions, and thereby improves their ability to imple-
ment growth-enhancing countercyclical budgetary policies? Preliminary work
with Enisse Kharroubi suggests that inﬂation is less negatively correlated with
growth, the higher a country’s degree of public debt procyclicality. Third, one
could analyze in more detail which types of countercyclical public spending
(consumption, investment) are most growth-enhancing, and on which sectors.
Finally, one could investigate the possible interactions between countercyclical
budgetary policy and structural reforms in the product and labor markets.
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21Table 1: Summary statistics 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP gap 764 -0.001 0.028 -0.109 0.160
Gross government debt/GDP 756 0.501 0.283 0.044 1.608
(d.Gross government debt-interests)/GDP 754 0.008 0.041 -0.113 0.195
Government consumption/GDP 1029 0.182 0.045 0.057 0.301
d.Government consumption/GDP 1003 0.017 0.011 -0.009 0.081
Government investment/GDP 966 0.036 0.011 0.012 0.115
d.Government investment/GDP 939 0.003 0.005 -0.016 0.041
Procyclicality of gross government debt (AR(1)) 612 -0.925 1.042 -4.206 1.447
Procyclicality of gross government debt (10-years 
rolling window) 454 -1.179 1.923 -9.259 3.466
Procyclicality of gross government debt (weighted 
rolling window) 643 -1.072 1.169 -4.000 1.951
Procyclicality of government consumption (AR(1)) 605 0.126 0.209 -0.850 0.771
Procyclicality of government consumption (10-years 
rolling window) 425 0.133 0.240 -0.767 0.891
Procyclicality of government consumption (weighted 
rolling window) 605 0.143 0.161 -0.368 0.584
Procyclicality of government investment (AR(1)) 605 0.073 0.061 -0.108 0.286
Procyclicality of government investment (10-years 
rolling window) 425 0.093 0.142 -0.588 0.574
Procyclicality of government investment (weighted 
rolling window) 605 0.077 0.092 -0.314 0.399
Growth of GDP per capita 1117 0.027 0.029 -0.942 0.199
Private credit/GDP 983 0.679 0.437 0.013 2.370
Average years of schooling for the population over 25 
years old 1078 7.691 2.285 1.940 12.250
Openness 1242 50.131 40.938 3.648 266.883
Inflation 1212 0.085 0.125 -0.105 1.408
Population growth 1132 0.008 0.008 -0.038 0.047
Government share of GDP (in %) 1241 13.292 5.779 3.008 32.115
Investment/GDP (in%) 1241 23.325 5.407 8.208 41.635
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
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Note:  the  graph  plots  the  it a1   coefficients,  i.e.  the  coefficients  on  the  output  gap  composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 









1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
United States United Kingdom
France EMU countries
 
Note:  the  graph  plots  the  it a1   coefficients,  i.e.  the  coefficients  on  the  output  gap  composite 
variable (see equation 1), using the AR(1) MCMC method. For EMU countries (i.e. countries who 
are or will be part of the EMU), the line represents the average of the estimated coefficients for 
the EMU countries present in the sample; the average is only computed for those years where all 
EMU countries have non-missing observations. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
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Note:  the  graph  plots  the  it a1   coefficients,  i.e.  the  coefficients  on  the  output  gap  composite 
variable (see equation 1), using the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method. For EMU 
countries (i.e. countries who are or will be part of the EMU), the line represents the average of the 
estimated coefficients for the EMU countries present in the sample; the average is only computed 
for those years where all EMU countries have non-missing observations. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Table 2: The effect of public debt procyclicality on growth, AR(1) MCMC method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.004 -0.023 -0.022 -0.015 -0.018
(0.002)* (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)**
lag(Private credit/GDP) 0.000 -0.003 0.010 -0.012 -0.011
(0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011)
0.004 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.014
(0.003) (0.005)*** (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.007)**
lag(log (real GDP per -0.001 -0.098 -0.177 -0.134 -0.276
capita)) (0.001) (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.023)*** (0.030)***
-0.001 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.009
(0.001) (0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.003)** (0.004)**
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)
Inflation -0.047 -0.071 -0.094 -0.043 -0.055
(0.021)** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)* (0.021)**
Population growth -1.250 -2.085 -2.278 -1.481 -1.571
(0.405)*** (0.317)*** (0.246)*** (0.283)*** (0.230)***
Government share of GDP (in %) 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)*
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant -0.005 -0.906 -1.672 -1.151 -2.242
(0.021) (0.136)*** (0.093)*** (0.192)*** (0.113)***
Observations 460 441 441 441 441
R-squared 0.17 0.4 0.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country f.e. Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt)
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
 Table 3: The effect of public debt procyclicality on growth, Gaussian-weighted OLS method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.003 -0.029 -0.023 -0.010 -0.009
(0.003) (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.004)** (0.010)
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.009 0.000 0.008 -0.026 -0.031
(0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)*** (0.016)**
-0.001 0.020 0.015 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.005)*** (0.008)* (0.004) (0.008)
lag(log (real GDP per -0.001 -0.108 -0.264 -0.149 -0.508
capita)) (0.002) (0.018)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.037)***
0.001 0.004 0.021 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.006)
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Inflation -0.048 -0.077 -0.084 -0.032 -0.043
(0.025)* (0.024)*** (0.021)*** (0.033) (0.020)**
Population growth -0.492 -1.987 -2.016 -1.026 -1.188
(0.374) (0.500)*** (0.256)*** (0.375)*** (0.225)***
Government share of GDP (in %) 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Constant -0.022 -1.045 -2.533 -1.330 -4.172
(0.028) (0.187)*** (0.091)*** (0.235)*** (0.079)***
Observations 485 465 465 465 465
R-squared 0.11 0.37 0.64
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country f.e. Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt)
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
 Table 4: Implied effect on growth of a change in the procyclicality of public debt such that the EMU 
























EMU in 2000 -0.0180 * -1.1840 + 0.0140 * -1.0943 * 0.9242 = 0.0072
US in 2000 -0.0180 * -1.1840 + 0.0140 * -2.5688 * 2.1696 = -0.0567
Panel B: WRW
EMU in 2000 -0.0090 * -1.2990 + 0.0030 * -1.2006 * 0.9242 = 0.0084
US in 2000 -0.0090 * -1.2990 + 0.0030 * -2.8184 * 2.1696 = -0.0067
 
Note: The estimated coefficients are taken from estimates columns 5 of Tables 2 (Panel A) and 3 
(Panel B). The difference US-EMU is defined as: (procyclicality of government debt in the US in 
2000)- (procyclicality of government debt in the EMU in 2000). The averages of variables are 
calculated using the same sample on which regressions were estimated.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
 Table 5: The effects of government consumption procyclicality on growth, AR(1) MCMC method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.007
(0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024)
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.002 -0.011 -0.007 -0.016 -0.023
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)** (0.010)**
-0.021 -0.030 -0.020 -0.022 -0.007
(0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.018) (0.032)
lag(log (real GDP per -0.002 -0.086 -0.147 -0.122 -0.274
capita)) (0.001) (0.016)*** (0.020)*** (0.024)*** (0.032)***
-0.001 0.008 0.017 0.006 0.010
(0.001) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)** (0.004)***
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 0.000
Inflation -0.062 -0.075 -0.101 -0.037 -0.059
(0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.024) (0.022)***
Population growth -0.614 -1.637 -1.379 -1.174 -0.744
(0.315)* (0.542)*** (0.437)*** (0.462)** (0.404)*
Government share of GDP (in %) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Constant -0.002 -0.810 -1.391 -1.085 -2.210
(0.020) (0.147)*** (0.098)*** (0.197)*** (0.115)***
Observations 453 434 434 434 434
R-squared 0.13 0.32 0.56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
lag(Procyclicality of government 
consumption*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
Country f.e. Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
consumption)
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
 Table 6: The effects of public investment procyclicality on growth, AR(1) MCMC method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.010 -0.336 -0.398 -0.324 -0.464
(0.053) (0.107)*** (0.159)** (0.087)*** (0.151)***
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.007 -0.022 -0.008 -0.027 -0.027
(0.005) (0.008)*** (0.012) (0.007)*** (0.012)**
0.023 0.069 -0.022 0.091 0.018
(0.064) (0.066) (0.114) (0.051)* (0.107)
lag(log (real GDP per -0.001 -0.092 -0.168 -0.132 -0.295
capita)) (0.001) (0.014)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)*** (0.031)***
-0.001 0.009 0.019 0.007 0.011
(0.001) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)***
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*
Inflation -0.055 -0.069 -0.100 -0.038 -0.054
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)* (0.021)**
Population growth -0.662 -1.393 -1.206 -0.936 -0.646
(0.321)** (0.529)*** (0.446)*** (0.435)** (0.404)
Government share of GDP (in %) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Constant 0.003 -0.838 -1.561 -1.143 -2.374
(0.021) (0.131)*** (0.092)*** (0.191)*** (0.111)***
Observations 453 434 434 434 434
R-squared 0.11 0.33 0.56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country f.e. Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
investment)
lag(Procyclicality of government 
investment*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
Table 7: The determinants of government debt procyclicality 
OLS Country Country OLS Country Country
f.e. year f.e. f.e. year f.e.
Private credit/GDP -0.567 -1.079 -0.959 -0.569 -0.894 -0.912
(0.162)*** (0.124)*** (0.132)*** (0.114)*** (0.134)*** (0.143)***
EMU country 0.395 0.165
(0.103)*** (0.083)**
Standard error  -4.929 -8.684
of GDP growth (1.571)*** (1.549)***
Lag(log (real GDP 0.017 -0.543 0.270 0.030 0.206 0.475
per capita)) (0.040) (0.247)** (0.553) (0.048) (0.266) (0.502)
Openness 0.005 0.010 0.021 -0.003 -0.004 0.015
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)** (0.004) (0.005)***
Government share  -0.019 -0.012 -0.025 0.004 -0.009 -0.022
of GDP (in %) (0.010)** (0.005)** (0.005)*** (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)***
Constant -0.286 -4.700 1.443 0.455 2.123 3.611
(0.559) (2.083)** (4.736) (0.545) (2.341) (4.307)
Observations 489 489 489 515 515 515
R-squared 0.11 0.86 0.87 0.18 0.77 0.79
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
WRW AR(1)
 
Note: The explained variable is the coefficient on the GDP gap composite variable from equation 
1, estimated using the AR(1) MCMC method for columns 1-3, and the Gaussian-weighted rolling 
window method for columns 4-6. EMU country is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all countries 
that are part of the EMU as of 2006.  




 Appendix 1: the AR(1) MCMC method for cal-
culating cyclicality in the ￿rst stage
The aim of this section is to give a brief description of how we used the Kalman
smoother together with Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC) in order
to estimate the coe¢ cients ajit from equation 1 under the assumption that they
follow an AR(1) process as desribed by equation 2. The implementation was
carried out in Matlab.
Estimating the means and variances of the coe¢ cients of interest - that is
ajit in equation 2 - involves two procedures: Kalman smoothing1 and MCMC.
To compute the coe¢ cients with the Kalman smoother for each country, we
need to know the values of ￿ve variances :
￿ ￿2
aj in equation 2, for j = 1;2;3;4, i.e. the process variances in the
terminology of the Kalman smoother
￿ the variance ￿2
" of the error term "t in equation 1, i.e. the measurement
error variance in the terminology of the Kalman smoother.
Moreover, to use the Kalman smoother, we need a prior for the ￿rst period
of observation for each country, that is a speci￿cation of our expectation over
the values ajit at the ￿rst time step. As we do not have any meaningful prior
information about cyclicality at the ￿rst observed period, we use a very high
variance around the prior mean, so that this prior has a negligeable e⁄ect on the
estimates. Speci￿cally, the set of initial values for the coe¢ cients were chosen
to be the OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients using the ￿rst 10 years of data for
each country, and the value of the intial variance is set to be 100000 times the
estimated variance of these coe¢ cients.
However, the process variances ￿2
aj and the measurement error variance ￿2
"
are unknown and we do not have any meaninful prior over them. We therefore
need a method to ￿nd reasonable values for these ￿ve unknown variances. This
is where MCMC methods are useful .
One can think of MCMC as the opposite of simulating. In the case of
simulation we know the parameters of our process, for example the variances,
and every time we run a simulation program, it gives us a set of possible observed
data. More speci￿cally, the probability of getting any set of observed data is the
probability de￿ned by the model that we have and the parameters. MCMC is
the opposite: we assume that we have a given dataset, and we are producing a
1For an excellent overview of the Kalman ￿lter and smoother, see
the notes by Max Welling "Kalman Filters", available on the web at
http://www.ics.uci.edu/~welling/classnotes/classnotes.html. The di⁄erence between
the Kalman ￿lter and smoother is that the latter uses future values as well as past values to
estimate the coe¢ cients of interest. We use the Kalman smoother here rather than the ￿lter
for two reasons. First, we want to make maximum use of a limited data and the smoother
uses more information. Second, given the nature of the problem at hand, the government has
to rely on beliefs about future states in order to set policy, so that the future should matter
as well as the present in de￿ning policy cyclicality.
1set of possible parameters. This is done in such a fashion that the probability of
accepting a parameter value is identical to the probability that this parameter
value has actually produced the data.
Speci￿cally, in our implementation, we use the classic Metropolis-Hastings
(MH) sampler to do MCMC (for an introduction to MCMC and Metropolis-
Hastings, see for example Chib and Greenberg (1995)). In MH one starts with
arbitrary parameters values. Every iteration one proposes a random change (in
our case a small gaussian change) of the parameters. This is what is called the
proposal distribution. Subsequently, this change is either accepted or rejected.








It is easy to prove that this procedure is actually sampling from the correct
posterior distribution over the parameter values.
MCMC algorithms go through two di⁄erent stages. In the ￿rst stage the
sampler converges to a probable interpretation of the data in terms of the pa-
rameters. This stage is called burn-in and took about 500 iterations in our
case. Within these 500 iterations, probabilities increased dramatically and then
converged to a stable high level. Afterwards, the MCMC algorithm is exploring
the space of relevant parameters. Over 3 runs, we took 10000 samples per run
after the end of burn-in. To avoid the autocorrelation that typically charac-
terizes a Markov Chain, we only retain samples every 100 iterations in order
to compute the ￿nal estimates. From these 3 runs, we thus get a total of 300
essentially uncorrelated samples for each of the ￿ve parameters we wish to es-
timate. Convergence of the Markov chain was assessed comparing the within
chain correlation with the across chain correlation. From these 300 samples, we
can then directly estimate means and variances of the 5 parameters of interest.
In order to correcly infer the e⁄ect of cyclicality on growth in our second
stage regressions, we need to determine not only the value of the cyclicality
(a1it), but also the uncertainty we have about it. To estimate this uncertainty,
or in other words the standard deviation of the cyclicality estimates, it is nec-
essary to consider the relevant sources of uncertainty. Two sources are relevant
in our case. One is the uncertainty that is represented by the Kalman smoother
that stems from the ￿nite number of noisy observations. The other source of
uncertainty is uncertainty about the 5 parameters of the AR(1) processes that
are modeled by the MCMC process. To combine them, we use the approxima-
tion variancetotal = varianceMCMC +varianceKalman, where varianceKalman
denotes the average variance over the 300 Kalman smoother runs using the 300
samples that we retained from the MCMC estimates of the 5 variances. This
approximation becomes correct if the variance as estimated by the Kalman
smoother is similar over di⁄erent runs of the Markov chain, which was a good
appriximation for our data.
Finally, a full general statistical description of the methods used here can be
found in Kording-Marinescu(2006).
2Appendix 2: Procyclicality estimates 
Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1989 Australia -0.337 -0.693 0.078 0.027 0.050 -0.020
1990 Australia -0.542 -0.700 0.070 0.026 0.051 -0.024
1991 Australia -0.780 -0.724 0.061 0.025 0.051 -0.018
1992 Australia -1.032 -0.786 0.052 0.025 0.051 -0.016
1993 Australia -1.278 -0.929 0.044 0.024 0.051 -0.023
1994 Australia -0.224 -1.503 -1.154 0.082 0.037 0.023 0.089 0.051 -0.024
1995 Australia -1.014 -1.700 -1.222 0.064 0.031 0.023 -0.167 0.052 -0.035
1996 Australia -0.960 -1.872 -1.292 0.046 0.026 0.023 0.006 0.053 -0.042
1997 Australia -2.375 -2.025 -1.363 0.040 0.023 0.023 0.109 0.053 -0.049
1998 Australia -4.056 -2.172 -1.436 -0.035 0.021 0.023 0.163 0.052 -0.055
1999 Australia -8.856 -2.322 -1.451 -0.047 0.019 0.023 0.104 0.050 -0.072
2000 Australia -5.228 -2.485 -1.438 0.054 0.017 0.023 -0.279 0.045 -0.041
2001 Australia -4.397 -2.665 -1.460 0.043 0.017 0.023 -0.220 0.037 -0.039
2002 Australia -2.864 -1.447 0.016 0.023 0.024 -0.033
2003 Australia -3.078 -1.452 0.015 0.023 0.007 -0.031
2004 Australia -3.297 -1.444 0.014 0.023 -0.013 -0.030
2005 Australia -3.509 -1.443 0.012 0.023 -0.037 -0.029
1972 Austria -0.849 -0.345 -0.084 0.032 -0.095 0.277
1973 Austria -0.797 -0.362 -0.075 0.031 -0.117 0.265
1974 Austria -0.746 -0.342 -0.068 0.031 -0.134 0.237
1975 Austria -0.698 -0.332 -0.062 0.029 -0.144 0.160
1976 Austria -0.652 -0.290 -0.056 0.026 -0.147 0.096
1977 Austria -0.550 -0.608 -0.247 -0.096 -0.049 0.025 -0.129 -0.141 0.029
1978 Austria -0.655 -0.568 -0.253 -0.022 -0.040 0.024 -0.260 -0.125 0.014
1979 Austria -0.680 -0.535 -0.259 -0.020 -0.029 0.022 -0.247 -0.100 -0.002
1980 Austria -0.666 -0.512 -0.250 -0.049 -0.015 0.023 -0.207 -0.066 -0.008
1981 Austria -0.226 -0.500 -0.233 -0.009 0.000 0.024 -0.207 -0.028 0.010
1982 Austria -0.065 -0.497 -0.224 -0.101 0.013 0.026 -0.157 0.010 0.031
1983 Austria -0.200 -0.501 -0.215 -0.154 0.025 0.027 -0.171 0.046 0.073
1984 Austria -0.650 -0.508 -0.188 -0.062 0.033 0.027 -0.168 0.076 0.106
1985 Austria -0.304 -0.514 -0.117 0.012 0.040 0.029 -0.036 0.103 0.135
1986 Austria 0.017 -0.515 -0.115 0.044 0.046 0.030 0.155 0.128 0.176
1987 Austria -0.253 -0.508 -0.079 0.058 0.053 0.034 0.232 0.154 0.233
1988 Austria -0.397 -0.487 -0.034 0.069 0.062 0.035 0.225 0.182 0.266
1989 Austria -0.627 -0.449 -0.006 0.105 0.073 0.036 0.307 0.212 0.285
1990 Austria -0.666 -0.395 0.008 0.103 0.086 0.037 0.309 0.243 0.298
1991 Austria -0.847 -0.329 -0.048 0.111 0.097 0.036 0.344 0.270 0.311
1992 Austria -0.604 -0.262 -0.093 0.132 0.104 0.035 0.327 0.287 0.315
1993 Austria -0.717 -0.199 -0.063 0.058 0.104 0.034 0.293 0.290 0.302
1994 Austria -1.222 -0.142 -0.034 0.021 0.095 0.033 0.238 0.278 0.290
1995 Austria 0.731 -0.086 -0.005 0.160 0.078 0.032 0.379 0.251 0.276
1996 Austria 0.364 -0.031 0.034 0.108 0.054 0.030 0.170 0.213 0.259
1997 Austria 0.261 0.021 0.064 0.097 0.025 0.029 0.156 0.168 0.241
1998 Austria 0.548 0.063 0.090 -0.004 -0.005 0.027 0.067 0.122 0.222
1999 Austria 0.404 0.091 0.130 -0.074 -0.033 0.025 -0.018 0.081 0.183
2000 Austria 0.013 0.104 0.083 -0.101 -0.054 0.023 -0.022 0.049 0.128
2001 Austria 0.174 0.106 0.090 -0.108 -0.070 0.022 -0.023 0.027 0.107
2002 Austria 0.102 0.087 -0.081 0.021 0.013 0.092
2003 Austria 0.100 0.081 -0.087 0.020 0.004 0.078
2004 Austria 0.102 0.024 -0.091 0.019 -0.001 0.072
2005 Austria 0.112 0.017 -0.094 0.019 -0.004 0.077
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1972 Germany -0.201 -0.100 0.090 0.089 0.010 0.219
1973 Germany -0.153 -0.165 0.087 0.091 0.012 0.245
1974 Germany -0.116 -0.202 0.086 0.095 0.019 0.234
1975 Germany -0.091 -0.215 0.086 0.095 0.029 0.181
1976 Germany -0.077 -0.197 0.088 0.095 0.042 0.140
1977 Germany -0.682 -0.072 -0.167 0.235 0.092 0.097 -0.003 0.057 0.136
1978 Germany -0.087 -0.078 -0.101 0.116 0.097 0.100 0.071 0.073 0.157
1979 Germany -0.072 -0.093 -0.134 0.059 0.103 0.101 0.057 0.089 0.165
1980 Germany -0.204 -0.115 -0.198 0.099 0.110 0.101 0.144 0.104 0.203
1981 Germany -0.075 -0.144 -0.251 0.196 0.118 0.100 0.348 0.114 0.207
1982 Germany -0.204 -0.182 -0.314 0.229 0.124 0.100 0.303 0.118 0.203
1983 Germany -0.316 -0.234 -0.377 0.206 0.128 0.098 0.241 0.113 0.172
1984 Germany -0.261 -0.307 -0.430 0.178 0.129 0.096 0.177 0.100 0.150
1985 Germany -0.385 -0.405 -0.496 0.189 0.126 0.095 0.169 0.079 0.128
1986 Germany -0.312 -0.523 -0.567 0.151 0.120 0.093 0.128 0.052 0.107
1987 Germany -0.394 -0.653 -0.640 0.173 0.112 0.091 -0.143 0.024 0.082
1988 Germany -1.510 -0.790 -0.710 0.010 0.102 0.089 -0.521 -0.001 0.056
1989 Germany -1.074 -0.933 -0.779 0.005 0.092 0.088 -0.172 -0.022 0.028
1990 Germany -1.480 -1.079 -0.810 -0.039 0.083 0.087 -0.281 -0.034 0.037
1991 Germany -1.547 -1.217 -0.840 -0.083 0.077 0.086 -0.348 -0.038 0.066
1992 Germany -2.402 -1.336 -0.818 -0.005 0.074 0.087 -0.298 -0.033 0.140
1993 Germany -2.516 -1.430 -0.835 0.015 0.074 0.087 -0.281 -0.020 0.166
1994 Germany -2.237 -1.501 -0.801 0.054 0.076 0.086 -0.201 -0.001 0.168
1995 Germany -2.451 -1.558 -0.858 0.069 0.080 0.086 -0.104 0.020 0.176
1996 Germany -1.795 -1.610 -0.783 0.155 0.084 0.085 0.324 0.043 0.184
1997 Germany -1.265 -1.665 -0.758 0.221 0.087 0.085 0.574 0.067 0.198
1998 Germany 0.084 -1.726 -0.764 0.016 0.090 0.083 0.407 0.092 0.192
1999 Germany -1.037 -1.793 -0.746 0.122 0.091 0.082 0.258 0.115 0.190
2000 Germany -2.829 -1.862 -0.772 0.149 0.090 0.082 0.236 0.137 0.191
2001 Germany -2.534 -1.927 -0.811 0.155 0.088 0.082 0.276 0.155 0.189
2002 Germany -1.985 -0.851 0.085 0.081 0.169 0.186
2003 Germany -2.032 -0.860 0.082 0.081 0.180 0.190
2004 Germany -2.070 -0.881 0.080 0.080 0.186 0.187
2005 Germany -2.100 -0.899 0.080 0.079 0.191 0.178
1981 Denmark -2.526 -3.854 0.059 0.042 0.393 -0.533
1982 Denmark -2.583 -4.098 0.049 0.042 0.353 -0.498
1983 Denmark -2.642 -4.061 0.039 0.042 0.316 -0.343
1984 Denmark -2.713 -3.863 0.031 0.040 0.282 -0.263
1985 Denmark -2.806 -3.694 0.024 0.039 0.248 -0.207
1986 Denmark -2.077 -2.928 -3.476 0.107 0.018 0.036 0.537 0.213 -0.160
1987 Denmark -1.316 -3.082 -3.587 0.082 0.013 0.037 0.461 0.177 -0.058
1988 Denmark -2.078 -3.264 -3.664 -0.162 0.010 0.035 0.173 0.139 -0.062
1989 Denmark -3.931 -3.464 -3.725 -0.013 0.007 0.034 0.067 0.099 -0.059
1990 Denmark -3.776 -3.661 -3.800 -0.009 0.006 0.033 0.088 0.059 -0.059
1991 Denmark -3.895 -3.830 -3.884 -0.026 0.006 0.031 0.070 0.024 -0.072
1992 Denmark -4.584 -3.948 -4.032 0.053 0.006 0.028 0.257 -0.001 -0.074
1993 Denmark -4.914 -4.004 -4.206 -0.004 0.006 0.029 -0.124 -0.013 -0.083
1994 Denmark -4.578 -4.001 -3.980 -0.017 0.004 0.028 -0.086 -0.015 -0.065
1995 Denmark -5.230 -3.946 -3.768 -0.015 0.002 0.028 -0.150 -0.012 -0.051
1996 Denmark -5.126 -3.846 -3.556 -0.027 0.001 0.028 -0.087 -0.006 -0.036
1997 Denmark -5.176 -3.704 -3.351 -0.054 0.001 0.028 -0.104 0.000 -0.027
1998 Denmark -5.557 -3.522 -3.200 0.031 0.003 0.028 -0.084 0.009 -0.005
1999 Denmark 2.109 -3.297 -3.112 0.138 0.006 0.029 0.322 0.020 -0.003
2000 Denmark 2.037 -3.022 -2.856 0.107 0.011 0.030 0.371 0.035 0.010
2001 Denmark 1.633 -2.688 -2.580 0.098 0.016 0.031 0.355 0.053 0.043
2002 Denmark -2.286 -2.404 0.023 0.031 0.075 0.048
2003 Denmark -1.816 -2.255 0.030 0.031 0.100 0.055
2004 Denmark -1.288 -2.259 0.037 0.030 0.127 0.054
2005 Denmark -0.724 -2.274 0.044 0.030 0.155 0.055
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1978 Spain -3.334 -2.535 -0.145 0.084 0.131 -0.850
1979 Spain -3.121 -2.566 -0.107 0.083 0.123 -0.802
1980 Spain -2.892 -2.596 -0.070 0.080 0.117 -0.698
1981 Spain -2.655 -2.577 -0.035 0.078 0.113 -0.546
1982 Spain -2.419 -2.653 0.001 0.077 0.112 -0.430
1983 Spain -5.050 -2.194 -2.680 -0.293 0.036 0.086 0.313 0.116 -0.341
1984 Spain -4.495 -1.993 -2.606 0.297 0.069 0.091 -0.083 0.123 -0.211
1985 Spain -1.570 -1.829 -2.332 0.295 0.098 0.095 0.078 0.133 -0.118
1986 Spain -1.193 -1.711 -2.096 0.204 0.119 0.104 0.038 0.143 -0.055
1987 Spain -1.030 -1.642 -1.976 0.165 0.132 0.112 0.025 0.153 0.001
1988 Spain -0.813 -1.616 -1.860 0.213 0.139 0.120 0.021 0.162 0.078
1989 Spain -1.328 -1.625 -1.697 0.135 0.141 0.126 0.172 0.172 0.178
1990 Spain -1.115 -1.666 -1.668 0.023 0.142 0.129 0.092 0.183 0.236
1991 Spain -0.883 -1.738 -1.771 0.137 0.142 0.128 0.098 0.197 0.292
1992 Spain -0.498 -1.847 -1.859 0.162 0.145 0.129 0.250 0.213 0.363
1993 Spain -1.768 -1.992 -1.941 0.127 0.150 0.130 0.457 0.230 0.427
1994 Spain -2.388 -2.164 -1.983 0.260 0.157 0.131 0.305 0.246 0.472
1995 Spain -2.956 -2.348 -2.207 0.262 0.164 0.133 0.300 0.259 0.420
1996 Spain -2.828 -2.522 -2.350 0.125 0.170 0.135 0.359 0.267 0.421
1997 Spain -3.200 -2.674 -2.254 0.030 0.174 0.132 0.385 0.272 0.460
1998 Spain -3.025 -2.796 -2.284 0.134 0.175 0.130 0.289 0.272 0.466
1999 Spain -2.886 -2.890 -2.259 0.137 0.174 0.129 0.346 0.269 0.464
2000 Spain -5.457 -2.962 -2.255 0.213 0.171 0.129 -0.004 0.265 0.458
2001 Spain -6.129 -3.018 -2.261 0.279 0.167 0.129 -0.002 0.258 0.450
2002 Spain -3.064 -2.257 0.161 0.128 0.250 0.445
2003 Spain -3.104 -2.253 0.154 0.128 0.242 0.441
2004 Spain -3.140 -2.249 0.146 0.128 0.232 0.439
2005 Spain -3.172 -2.244 0.137 0.128 0.222 0.437
1976 Finland -1.609 -1.340 0.067 0.104 0.560 0.410
1977 Finland -1.559 -1.354 0.071 0.104 0.493 0.421
1978 Finland -1.509 -1.374 0.073 0.105 0.424 0.424
1979 Finland -1.464 -1.384 0.074 0.106 0.357 0.401
1980 Finland -1.427 -1.394 0.075 0.107 0.298 0.377
1981 Finland -1.338 -1.402 -1.408 0.125 0.077 0.107 0.695 0.248 0.353
1982 Finland -0.706 -1.396 -1.417 0.257 0.080 0.107 0.641 0.211 0.323
1983 Finland -0.289 -1.415 -1.424 0.308 0.086 0.107 0.444 0.186 0.292
1984 Finland 0.095 -1.462 -1.422 0.274 0.095 0.108 -0.004 0.175 0.262
1985 Finland 0.144 -1.538 -1.448 0.235 0.107 0.108 0.005 0.178 0.234
1986 Finland 0.418 -1.635 -1.474 0.263 0.121 0.107 0.071 0.191 0.207
1987 Finland -0.731 -1.739 -1.505 0.312 0.133 0.107 0.021 0.210 0.174
1988 Finland -1.668 -1.830 -1.547 0.191 0.142 0.106 0.052 0.229 0.150
1989 Finland -1.746 -1.892 -1.642 0.212 0.145 0.104 0.070 0.241 0.170
1990 Finland -3.217 -1.920 -1.819 0.342 0.143 0.113 0.507 0.244 0.241
1991 Finland -3.296 -1.918 -1.967 0.332 0.137 0.116 0.424 0.239 0.258
1992 Finland -2.594 -1.893 -2.284 0.206 0.129 0.117 0.372 0.228 0.370
1993 Finland -1.934 -1.854 -1.738 0.168 0.119 0.114 0.269 0.212 0.342
1994 Finland -1.779 -1.804 -1.411 0.135 0.109 0.097 0.275 0.193 0.186
1995 Finland -1.973 -1.748 -1.610 0.105 0.099 0.093 0.218 0.174 0.073
1996 Finland -1.846 -1.684 -1.389 0.092 0.089 0.090 0.184 0.155 0.043
1997 Finland -1.429 -1.613 -1.367 0.070 0.079 0.088 0.075 0.137 0.060
1998 Finland -1.792 -1.534 -1.221 0.066 0.070 0.089 0.050 0.121 0.042
1999 Finland -1.571 -1.447 -1.026 0.014 0.062 0.089 -0.009 0.106 0.038
2000 Finland -1.961 -1.355 -0.942 0.017 0.054 0.088 -0.104 0.093 0.024
2001 Finland -0.511 -1.261 -0.907 -0.073 0.047 0.088 -0.241 0.082 0.025
2002 Finland -1.168 -0.887 0.040 0.089 0.072 0.029
2003 Finland -1.077 -0.876 0.034 0.090 0.063 0.047
2004 Finland -0.988 -0.859 0.029 0.090 0.054 0.067
2005 Finland -0.897 -0.843 0.025 0.090 0.045 0.069
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1978 France 0.708 0.491 0.015 0.041 0.011 0.145
1979 France 0.615 0.477 0.020 0.042 0.064 0.137
1980 France 0.536 0.453 0.023 0.042 0.108 0.146
1981 France 0.466 0.424 0.023 0.043 0.141 0.150
1982 France 0.400 0.317 0.023 0.044 0.162 0.169
1983 France 2.491 0.328 0.291 -0.041 0.022 0.046 -0.767 0.171 0.207
1984 France 0.437 0.244 0.220 0.174 0.021 0.046 0.085 0.165 0.224
1985 France 0.170 0.147 0.123 0.082 0.019 0.045 0.137 0.143 0.258
1986 France -0.184 0.043 -0.047 0.027 0.017 0.047 0.121 0.110 0.229
1987 France -0.027 -0.060 -0.237 0.031 0.014 0.047 0.122 0.071 0.205
1988 France -0.499 -0.153 -0.357 -0.036 0.012 0.048 0.113 0.032 0.182
1989 France -0.587 -0.236 -0.484 0.020 0.012 0.049 -0.022 0.000 0.161
1990 France -0.390 -0.316 -0.631 0.002 0.013 0.051 0.026 -0.021 0.142
1991 France -0.572 -0.402 -0.725 0.024 0.018 0.053 -0.017 -0.029 0.136
1992 France -0.900 -0.504 -0.794 0.022 0.027 0.055 -0.026 -0.024 0.127
1993 France -0.395 -0.624 -0.870 -0.118 0.040 0.058 -0.221 -0.008 0.119
1994 France 1.019 -0.758 -0.942 0.085 0.056 0.058 -0.426 0.016 0.160
1995 France -2.804 -0.893 -1.067 0.173 0.073 0.059 0.013 0.045 0.161
1996 France -1.643 -1.016 -1.017 0.206 0.088 0.059 0.114 0.074 0.122
1997 France -1.452 -1.121 -1.032 0.139 0.100 0.060 0.112 0.100 0.111
1998 France -0.852 -1.207 -1.116 0.113 0.108 0.058 0.052 0.120 0.146
1999 France -1.134 -1.281 -1.054 0.096 0.110 0.057 0.134 0.135 0.158
2000 France -1.431 -1.349 -1.107 0.099 0.109 0.056 0.138 0.146 0.169
2001 France -1.226 -1.417 -1.170 0.101 0.105 0.055 0.091 0.154 0.178
2002 France -1.488 -1.221 0.099 0.054 0.160 0.191
2003 France -1.559 -1.271 0.093 0.053 0.165 0.206
2004 France -1.625 -1.338 0.086 0.053 0.171 0.199
2005 France -1.679 -1.374 0.080 0.053 0.177 0.200
1971 United Kingdom -0.321 -0.749 0.252 0.181 -0.246 -0.595
1972 United Kingdom -0.174 -0.730 0.238 0.181 -0.170 -0.591
1973 United Kingdom -0.023 -0.720 0.223 0.181 -0.090 -0.588
1974 United Kingdom 0.123 -0.737 0.208 0.177 -0.010 -0.609
1975 United Kingdom 0.254 -0.752 0.192 0.173 0.064 -0.629
1976 United Kingdom -0.951 0.357 -0.687 0.255 0.177 0.171 -0.584 0.126 -0.481
1977 United Kingdom 0.451 0.421 -0.610 0.271 0.162 0.168 0.017 0.172 -0.386
1978 United Kingdom 1.665 0.438 -0.509 0.222 0.148 0.162 0.792 0.197 -0.351
1979 United Kingdom 1.749 0.402 -0.407 0.214 0.135 0.157 0.887 0.195 -0.317
1980 United Kingdom 1.763 0.313 -0.309 0.204 0.122 0.151 0.891 0.167 -0.286
1981 United Kingdom 1.926 0.182 -0.076 0.133 0.110 0.148 0.437 0.116 -0.081
1982 United Kingdom 2.063 0.028 0.003 0.176 0.098 0.139 -0.063 0.050 0.037
1983 United Kingdom 1.822 -0.125 -0.226 0.109 0.087 0.131 -0.107 -0.022 0.072
1984 United Kingdom 1.561 -0.262 -0.617 0.062 0.077 0.131 -0.163 -0.089 0.116
1985 United Kingdom 0.652 -0.373 -0.617 0.126 0.067 0.132 -0.363 -0.143 0.122
1986 United Kingdom 0.275 -0.463 -0.781 0.090 0.059 0.133 -0.140 -0.179 0.104
1987 United Kingdom 0.266 -0.548 -0.987 0.037 0.054 0.133 -0.066 -0.194 0.091
1988 United Kingdom 0.393 -0.653 -1.319 -0.083 0.053 0.135 -0.017 -0.186 0.084
1989 United Kingdom -0.657 -0.805 -1.627 0.068 0.057 0.143 0.258 -0.152 0.089
1990 United Kingdom -2.160 -1.020 -1.882 0.127 0.066 0.146 0.175 -0.095 0.117
1991 United Kingdom -2.509 -1.291 -2.080 0.153 0.081 0.148 0.254 -0.023 0.132
1992 United Kingdom -2.147 -1.591 -2.343 0.279 0.098 0.149 0.330 0.055 0.175
1993 United Kingdom -2.809 -1.887 -2.608 0.267 0.116 0.151 0.396 0.128 0.238
1994 United Kingdom -3.360 -2.153 -2.453 0.270 0.133 0.154 0.342 0.195 0.219
1995 United Kingdom -3.402 -2.377 -2.541 0.234 0.148 0.157 0.352 0.254 0.206
1996 United Kingdom -4.601 -2.553 -2.507 0.077 0.163 0.160 0.741 0.310 0.190
1997 United Kingdom -4.421 -2.681 -2.531 0.239 0.178 0.161 0.505 0.362 0.184
1998 United Kingdom -5.003 -2.767 -2.536 0.184 0.192 0.161 0.738 0.409 0.163
1999 United Kingdom -5.514 -2.826 -2.536 0.267 0.207 0.161 0.518 0.448 0.141
2000 United Kingdom -7.900 -2.876 -2.538 0.455 0.222 0.162 0.444 0.474 0.120
2001 United Kingdom -5.269 -2.932 -2.598 0.574 0.236 0.162 0.159 0.484 0.102
2002 United Kingdom -3.000 -2.613 0.250 0.162 0.474 0.088
2003 United Kingdom -3.073 -2.627 0.266 0.161 0.445 0.079
2004 United Kingdom -3.136 -2.625 0.281 0.162 0.395 0.078
2005 United Kingdom -3.167 -2.622 0.298 0.162 0.324 0.077
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.  






1980 Greece -0.167 -0.505
1981 Greece -0.404 -0.563
1982 Greece -0.851 -0.601
1983 Greece -1.101 -0.615
1984 Greece -0.719 -0.598
1985 Greece -0.578 -0.547
1986 Greece 0.058 -0.464
1987 Greece 0.359 -0.365
1988 Greece 1.565 -0.277
1989 Greece -1.524 -0.232
1990 Greece -0.215 -0.256
1991 Greece -0.211 -0.354
1992 Greece -0.920 -0.507
1993 Greece -4.638 -0.675
1994 Greece -7.648 -0.815
1995 Greece -9.259 -0.891
1996 Greece -4.887 -0.892
1997 Greece -3.114 -0.828
1998 Greece 1.453 -0.721
1999 Greece 0.565 -0.591
2000 Greece 0.426 -0.458





1978 Ireland -3.113 -0.142 0.298 0.284 0.434 0.715
1979 Ireland -3.136 -0.128 0.280 0.286 0.406 0.756
1980 Ireland -3.135 -0.358 0.263 0.285 0.383 0.771
1981 Ireland -3.104 -0.462 0.246 0.279 0.365 0.678
1982 Ireland -3.038 -0.763 0.230 0.273 0.353 0.598
1983 Ireland -3.386 -2.927 -1.073 0.288 0.214 0.267 0.309 0.346 0.514
1984 Ireland -3.406 -2.764 -1.059 0.215 0.197 0.262 0.235 0.346 0.498
1985 Ireland -3.531 -2.545 -1.115 0.221 0.181 0.255 0.253 0.353 0.465
1986 Ireland -3.047 -2.277 -1.279 0.185 0.166 0.250 0.321 0.365 0.410
1987 Ireland -3.345 -1.982 -1.043 0.193 0.151 0.250 0.339 0.381 0.512
1988 Ireland -3.404 -1.702 -0.971 0.213 0.138 0.245 0.365 0.396 0.554
1989 Ireland -2.780 -1.475 -0.959 0.115 0.124 0.238 0.337 0.403 0.539
1990 Ireland -1.868 -1.311 -0.947 0.081 0.110 0.230 0.326 0.400 0.523
1991 Ireland -1.953 -1.183 -0.917 0.082 0.096 0.223 0.357 0.390 0.473
1992 Ireland -0.995 -1.059 -0.894 0.097 0.084 0.217 0.470 0.377 0.424
1993 Ireland -0.794 -0.925 -0.967 0.048 0.078 0.210 0.419 0.366 0.379
1994 Ireland -0.795 -0.784 -0.633 0.037 0.078 0.208 0.399 0.357 0.368
1995 Ireland -0.108 -0.649 -0.575 0.052 0.087 0.209 0.341 0.350 0.388
1996 Ireland -0.859 -0.531 -0.482 -0.006 0.105 0.210 0.282 0.346 0.396
1997 Ireland -2.475 -0.439 -0.449 -0.068 0.132 0.212 0.226 0.342 0.389
1998 Ireland -1.527 -0.378 -0.439 0.177 0.164 0.214 0.122 0.339 0.379
1999 Ireland 0.162 -0.348 -0.418 0.479 0.197 0.216 0.406 0.335 0.366
2000 Ireland 0.010 -0.343 -0.510 0.383 0.227 0.216 0.423 0.332 0.372
2001 Ireland -0.326 -0.354 -0.407 0.309 0.251 0.215 0.339 0.328 0.405
2002 Ireland -0.373 -0.408 0.267 0.208 0.325 0.380
2003 Ireland -0.396 -0.414 0.277 0.206 0.322 0.371
2004 Ireland -0.419 -0.416 0.281 0.206 0.319 0.373
2005 Ireland -0.440 -0.411 0.281 0.206 0.318 0.377
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1981 Iceland -1.908 -1.588 0.023 0.110 -0.310 -0.392
1982 Iceland -1.864 -1.442 0.029 0.109 -0.258 -0.370
1983 Iceland -1.815 -1.479 0.036 0.107 -0.201 -0.367
1984 Iceland -1.759 -1.445 0.045 0.109 -0.136 -0.201
1985 Iceland -1.697 -1.364 0.054 0.109 -0.061 -0.163
1986 Iceland -1.773 -1.630 -1.309 0.055 0.065 0.112 -0.164 0.020 -0.026
1987 Iceland -1.394 -1.565 -1.234 0.043 0.075 0.116 -0.160 0.104 0.117
1988 Iceland -1.710 -1.507 -1.207 0.064 0.084 0.119 -0.176 0.183 0.160
1989 Iceland -1.545 -1.464 -1.181 0.167 0.092 0.121 0.201 0.252 0.205
1990 Iceland -1.109 -1.437 -1.161 0.092 0.098 0.123 0.279 0.304 0.251
1991 Iceland -0.786 -1.428 -1.146 0.058 0.101 0.125 0.628 0.336 0.294
1992 Iceland -1.123 -1.433 -1.248 0.133 0.102 0.127 0.610 0.351 0.333
1993 Iceland -1.384 -1.444 -1.406 0.146 0.101 0.124 0.415 0.351 0.231
1994 Iceland -1.587 -1.454 -1.425 0.199 0.097 0.133 0.367 0.339 0.197
1995 Iceland -1.731 -1.457 -1.336 0.169 0.093 0.142 0.344 0.320 0.144
1996 Iceland -1.615 -1.448 -1.169 0.079 0.088 0.139 0.286 0.297 0.122
1997 Iceland -1.272 -1.424 -1.001 0.100 0.085 0.140 0.297 0.276 0.103
1998 Iceland -1.667 -1.385 -0.828 0.076 0.085 0.140 0.240 0.260 0.078
1999 Iceland -2.662 -1.332 -0.655 0.323 0.089 0.137 0.260 0.253 0.020
2000 Iceland -0.927 -1.260 -0.377 0.510 0.101 0.134 0.413 0.256 -0.040
2001 Iceland 0.596 -1.162 -0.005 0.408 0.121 0.137 0.552 0.269 -0.074
2002 Iceland -1.026 -0.045 0.149 0.135 0.291 -0.094
2003 Iceland -0.844 -0.081 0.184 0.134 0.319 -0.118
2004 Iceland -0.612 -0.092 0.224 0.133 0.351 -0.137
2005 Iceland -0.334 -0.086 0.267 0.132 0.386 -0.138
1965 Italy 1.193 0.280 0.148 0.103 0.066 -0.164
1966 Italy 1.162 0.289 0.139 0.102 0.057 -0.125
1967 Italy 1.141 0.233 0.129 0.101 0.054 -0.123
1968 Italy 1.125 0.176 0.119 0.100 0.059 -0.121
1969 Italy 1.107 0.104 0.110 0.099 0.074 -0.117
1970 Italy 0.282 1.078 0.062 0.170 0.102 0.099 -0.028 0.100 -0.098
1971 Italy 1.538 1.026 0.165 0.027 0.095 0.097 0.311 0.137 -0.020
1972 Italy 1.753 0.940 0.251 0.066 0.090 0.096 0.287 0.183 0.010
1973 Italy 1.363 0.814 0.337 0.015 0.087 0.095 -0.308 0.233 0.041
1974 Italy 0.928 0.647 0.368 -0.050 0.086 0.095 -0.262 0.279 0.084
1975 Italy -0.661 0.451 0.282 -0.036 0.084 0.094 -0.026 0.313 0.113
1976 Italy -0.335 0.243 0.215 -0.026 0.082 0.095 0.124 0.330 0.131
1977 Italy -0.373 0.049 0.152 0.031 0.080 0.096 0.212 0.329 0.153
1978 Italy -0.323 -0.111 0.092 0.046 0.076 0.098 0.265 0.316 0.181
1979 Italy -0.247 -0.224 0.027 0.091 0.074 0.099 0.342 0.298 0.210
1980 Italy -0.404 -0.291 0.018 0.087 0.072 0.102 0.458 0.284 0.239
1981 Italy -0.345 -0.317 0.037 0.154 0.072 0.103 0.373 0.275 0.291
1982 Italy -0.450 -0.309 0.084 0.120 0.073 0.102 0.248 0.273 0.293
1983 Italy -0.278 -0.268 0.140 0.019 0.075 0.101 0.296 0.277 0.283
1984 Italy -0.470 -0.191 0.162 0.054 0.078 0.100 0.367 0.284 0.308
1985 Italy -0.735 -0.073 0.183 0.104 0.081 0.099 0.235 0.293 0.304
1986 Italy -0.269 0.084 0.295 0.144 0.083 0.099 0.456 0.302 0.317
1987 Italy 0.283 0.273 0.365 0.025 0.086 0.099 0.262 0.311 0.279
1988 Italy 0.271 0.476 0.462 0.078 0.088 0.100 0.458 0.317 0.269
1989 Italy 1.928 0.666 0.566 0.091 0.091 0.100 0.316 0.321 0.253
1990 Italy 1.249 0.818 0.753 0.073 0.095 0.101 0.344 0.324 0.291
1991 Italy 1.771 0.910 0.814 0.130 0.101 0.101 0.314 0.325 0.286
1992 Italy 2.100 0.929 0.897 0.184 0.107 0.102 0.123 0.327 0.278
1993 Italy 1.297 0.866 1.017 0.290 0.113 0.102 0.392 0.330 0.257
1994 Italy 0.293 0.722 0.758 0.362 0.118 0.100 0.569 0.334 0.261
1995 Italy -1.579 0.501 0.725 0.345 0.121 0.097 0.458 0.341 0.248
1996 Italy -1.670 0.220 0.676 0.356 0.120 0.094 0.526 0.350 0.208
1997 Italy -2.088 -0.093 0.679 0.317 0.115 0.091 0.518 0.361 0.214
1998 Italy -2.217 -0.399 0.624 0.352 0.105 0.089 0.553 0.374 0.229
1999 Italy -3.625 -0.661 0.620 -0.011 0.092 0.088 0.417 0.385 0.235
2000 Italy -1.371 -0.861 0.555 -0.035 0.075 0.087 0.259 0.392 0.240
2001 Italy -1.430 -1.001 0.489 -0.026 0.058 0.085 0.340 0.394 0.243
2002 Italy -1.100 0.430 0.041 0.084 0.391 0.242
2003 Italy -1.171 0.374 0.026 0.081 0.384 0.231
2004 Italy -1.224 0.322 0.011 0.083 0.376 0.245
2005 Italy -1.262 0.296 -0.002 0.083 0.367 0.271
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.  
Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1971 Japan -1.564 -1.220 0.399 0.061 -0.368 -0.227
1972 Japan -1.552 -1.242 0.399 0.061 -0.353 -0.218
1973 Japan -1.539 -1.280 0.399 0.062 -0.334 -0.207
1974 Japan -1.524 -1.287 0.399 0.060 -0.313 -0.217
1975 Japan -1.502 -1.336 0.397 0.057 -0.289 -0.187
1976 Japan -1.214 -1.475 -1.427 0.434 0.394 0.054 -0.411 -0.261 -0.135
1977 Japan -0.512 -1.451 -1.449 0.421 0.388 0.049 -0.357 -0.231 -0.125
1978 Japan -0.459 -1.448 -1.466 0.418 0.377 0.046 -0.291 -0.196 -0.112
1979 Japan 2.733 -1.487 -1.452 0.448 0.360 0.043 -0.512 -0.158 -0.101
1980 Japan 3.466 -1.589 -1.435 0.511 0.336 0.040 -0.672 -0.117 -0.085
1981 Japan 0.233 -1.760 -1.436 0.503 0.305 0.038 -0.058 -0.078 -0.076
1982 Japan -0.367 -1.982 -1.439 0.271 0.272 0.036 -0.080 -0.043 -0.066
1983 Japan -2.771 -2.232 -1.444 -0.063 0.237 0.034 0.083 -0.016 -0.055
1984 Japan -2.634 -2.490 -1.444 0.366 0.202 0.031 -0.032 0.002 -0.044
1985 Japan -2.599 -2.747 -1.458 0.194 0.170 0.027 0.063 0.012 -0.035
1986 Japan -2.188 -2.984 -1.486 0.115 0.141 0.023 0.052 0.015 -0.025
1987 Japan -2.801 -3.158 -1.464 0.106 0.116 0.019 0.061 0.016 -0.013
1988 Japan -2.680 -3.212 -1.506 0.174 0.092 0.016 0.045 0.018 -0.004
1989 Japan -3.372 -3.127 -1.544 0.014 0.064 0.014 0.113 0.024 0.007
1990 Japan -3.856 -2.939 -1.572 -0.172 0.029 0.011 0.138 0.032 0.010
1991 Japan -3.421 -2.713 -1.603 -0.289 -0.011 0.008 0.148 0.039 0.019
1992 Japan -2.212 -2.496 -1.490 -0.133 -0.050 0.006 0.126 0.043 0.017
1993 Japan -2.445 -2.304 -1.412 -0.158 -0.086 0.003 0.103 0.042 0.013
1994 Japan -2.636 -2.131 -1.332 -0.200 -0.115 0.001 0.090 0.036 0.008
1995 Japan -2.241 -1.958 -1.270 -0.268 -0.137 -0.002 0.054 0.028 0.003
1996 Japan -2.673 -1.763 -1.201 -0.366 -0.150 -0.006 0.066 0.019 0.000
1997 Japan -0.584 -1.536 -1.140 -0.471 -0.155 -0.010 -0.048 0.009 0.001
1998 Japan 1.005 -1.277 -1.090 -0.588 -0.152 -0.012 -0.075 0.002 0.003
1999 Japan 0.677 -0.998 -1.015 -0.476 -0.142 -0.013 -0.183 -0.003 0.005
2000 Japan 0.015 -0.714 -0.872 -0.355 -0.127 -0.012 -0.141 -0.004 0.008
2001 Japan 0.039 -0.440 -0.731 -0.135 -0.110 -0.012 -0.016 -0.001 0.012
2002 Japan -0.186 -0.618 -0.091 -0.011 0.004 0.025
2003 Japan 0.044 -0.637 -0.072 -0.009 0.011 0.053
2004 Japan 0.247 -0.634 -0.054 -0.008 0.021 0.059
2005 Japan 0.425 -0.631 -0.035 -0.007 0.031 0.066
1972 Netherlands -0.486 -0.469 0.113 0.080 0.368 0.176
1973 Netherlands -0.528 -0.471 0.115 0.079 0.371 0.174
1974 Netherlands -0.570 -0.480 0.115 0.079 0.375 0.182
1975 Netherlands -0.610 -0.490 0.114 0.079 0.376 0.153
1976 Netherlands -0.647 -0.497 0.111 0.080 0.377 0.156
1977 Netherlands -0.244 -0.678 -0.506 0.075 0.108 0.081 0.255 0.376 0.163
1978 Netherlands -0.199 -0.705 -0.522 0.072 0.103 0.082 -0.132 0.373 0.169
1979 Netherlands -0.137 -0.725 -0.537 0.085 0.098 0.083 -0.048 0.370 0.175
1980 Netherlands -0.446 -0.737 -0.553 0.169 0.093 0.084 -0.123 0.365 0.182
1981 Netherlands -0.271 -0.739 -0.563 0.133 0.088 0.085 0.219 0.360 0.181
1982 Netherlands -0.744 -0.728 -0.590 0.094 0.083 0.086 0.132 0.353 0.162
1983 Netherlands -1.008 -0.702 -0.638 0.086 0.079 0.085 0.284 0.346 0.228
1984 Netherlands -0.842 -0.662 -0.616 0.083 0.076 0.083 0.239 0.336 0.293
1985 Netherlands -0.677 -0.611 -0.601 0.100 0.074 0.084 0.172 0.325 0.241
1986 Netherlands -0.088 -0.552 -0.522 0.045 0.072 0.085 0.182 0.313 0.237
1987 Netherlands 0.705 -0.494 -0.454 0.011 0.071 0.085 0.208 0.301 0.231
1988 Netherlands 0.718 -0.450 -0.440 0.015 0.071 0.086 0.144 0.289 0.245
1989 Netherlands 0.458 -0.439 -0.408 0.077 0.072 0.087 0.234 0.281 0.249
1990 Netherlands 0.709 -0.476 -0.378 0.075 0.073 0.087 0.221 0.276 0.251
1991 Netherlands 0.749 -0.559 -0.469 0.071 0.076 0.088 0.212 0.274 0.280
1992 Netherlands 0.658 -0.666 -0.560 0.046 0.078 0.090 0.205 0.276 0.295
1993 Netherlands -0.055 -0.771 -0.654 0.056 0.081 0.092 0.256 0.281 0.303
1994 Netherlands 1.784 -0.879 -0.753 0.080 0.084 0.094 0.135 0.289 0.308
1995 Netherlands 1.682 -1.010 -0.862 0.080 0.088 0.095 0.186 0.302 0.311
1996 Netherlands 0.767 -1.170 -0.984 0.097 0.094 0.096 0.329 0.319 0.311
1997 Netherlands -1.593 -1.341 -1.102 0.058 0.101 0.097 0.017 0.338 0.323
1998 Netherlands -2.005 -1.498 -1.174 -0.022 0.109 0.098 0.077 0.358 0.314
1999 Netherlands -1.746 -1.627 -1.283 0.093 0.116 0.099 0.280 0.376 0.303
2000 Netherlands -1.975 -1.725 -1.408 0.122 0.122 0.101 0.364 0.392 0.323
2001 Netherlands -1.891 -1.796 -1.416 0.125 0.128 0.103 0.428 0.406 0.366
2002 Netherlands -1.847 -1.454 0.133 0.104 0.418 0.385
2003 Netherlands -1.881 -1.492 0.137 0.106 0.427 0.403
2004 Netherlands -1.904 -1.535 0.141 0.106 0.435 0.414
2005 Netherlands -1.918 -1.554 0.145 0.105 0.442 0.428
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.  
Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1971 Norway 1.080 1.346 0.048 0.092 0.174 0.206
1972 Norway 1.244 1.266 0.067 0.091 0.194 0.144
1973 Norway 1.396 1.275 0.083 0.086 0.211 0.147
1974 Norway 1.531 1.193 0.096 0.086 0.225 0.176
1975 Norway 1.645 1.207 0.106 0.086 0.237 0.248
1976 Norway 0.564 1.738 1.056 -0.019 0.113 0.081 0.089 0.245 0.220
1977 Norway 1.943 1.812 1.447 0.124 0.117 0.080 0.121 0.251 0.154
1978 Norway 1.958 1.869 1.391 0.139 0.120 0.077 0.168 0.254 0.142
1979 Norway 1.943 1.913 1.094 0.124 0.120 0.073 0.219 0.255 0.103
1980 Norway 1.650 1.941 1.062 0.114 0.119 0.073 0.261 0.252 0.154
1981 Norway 1.465 1.951 1.083 0.074 0.118 0.073 0.150 0.247 0.167
1982 Norway 2.584 1.937 1.129 0.098 0.115 0.074 0.037 0.238 0.158
1983 Norway 1.610 1.893 1.168 0.022 0.113 0.075 -0.111 0.227 0.152
1984 Norway 2.697 1.813 1.154 0.084 0.110 0.076 0.202 0.215 0.158
1985 Norway 1.498 1.700 1.153 0.057 0.108 0.078 0.177 0.202 0.154
1986 Norway 1.275 1.555 1.125 0.090 0.106 0.080 0.183 0.190 0.161
1987 Norway 1.488 1.384 0.830 0.103 0.104 0.080 0.099 0.178 0.205
1988 Norway 1.475 1.189 0.698 0.109 0.102 0.080 0.094 0.164 0.193
1989 Norway 1.268 0.975 0.539 0.124 0.100 0.080 0.112 0.147 0.140
1990 Norway 1.243 0.749 0.589 0.132 0.096 0.082 0.149 0.126 0.076
1991 Norway 2.147 0.524 0.450 0.163 0.092 0.081 0.193 0.102 0.058
1992 Norway -0.126 0.313 -0.061 0.106 0.088 0.084 0.132 0.078 0.087
1993 Norway -0.008 0.121 -0.635 0.119 0.083 0.086 -0.109 0.056 0.141
1994 Norway -0.585 -0.053 -0.830 0.099 0.080 0.084 -0.046 0.040 0.176
1995 Norway -0.437 -0.218 -1.019 0.084 0.079 0.081 -0.090 0.029 0.191
1996 Norway -1.136 -0.384 -1.201 0.052 0.079 0.079 -0.035 0.024 0.202
1997 Norway -2.887 -0.558 -1.374 0.165 0.081 0.077 0.078 0.024 0.211
1998 Norway -6.092 -0.749 -1.478 0.372 0.085 0.073 0.225 0.030 0.232
1999 Norway -7.026 -0.966 -1.458 0.326 0.090 0.069 0.190 0.041 0.227
2000 Norway -7.278 -1.215 -1.384 0.384 0.096 0.067 0.249 0.058 0.244
2001 Norway -5.882 -1.501 -1.375 0.296 0.102 0.066 0.326 0.082 0.284
2002 Norway -1.817 -1.327 0.107 0.065 0.115 0.300
2003 Norway -2.146 -1.270 0.109 0.064 0.156 0.315
2004 Norway -2.456 -1.254 0.107 0.064 0.206 0.316
2005 Norway -2.703 -1.238 0.098 0.064 0.261 0.318
1995 New Zealand -0.303 -0.252 -0.091 -0.105 0.584 0.536
1996 New Zealand -0.396 -0.252 -0.094 -0.106 0.550 0.530
1997 New Zealand -0.494 -0.208 -0.096 -0.106 0.516 0.543
1998 New Zealand -0.592 -0.172 -0.099 -0.106 0.484 0.552
1999 New Zealand -0.687 -0.150 -0.101 -0.107 0.454 0.503
2000 New Zealand -0.998 -0.771 -0.136 -0.077 -0.104 -0.108 0.488 0.427 0.492
2001 New Zealand -0.728 -0.838 -0.127 -0.094 -0.108 -0.108 0.511 0.403 0.505
2002 New Zealand -0.884 -0.135 -0.113 -0.108 0.384 0.509
2003 New Zealand -0.905 -0.143 -0.118 -0.108 0.371 0.509
2004 New Zealand -0.898 -0.145 -0.124 -0.107 0.364 0.520
2005 New Zealand -0.866 -0.145 -0.132 -0.107 0.365 0.520
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1971 Portugal -2.163 -1.696
1972 Portugal -2.226 -1.632
1973 Portugal -2.278 -1.508
1974 Portugal -2.310 -1.616
1975 Portugal -2.308 -1.670
1976 Portugal -2.044 -2.259 -1.689
1977 Portugal -2.048 -2.162 -1.710
1978 Portugal -2.060 -2.027 -1.759 0.053 0.049 -0.003 0.275
1979 Portugal -4.116 -1.873 -1.809 0.053 0.048 0.018 0.276
1980 Portugal -5.985 -1.718 -1.618 0.052 0.049 0.032 0.301
1981 Portugal -6.769 -1.568 -1.560 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.260
1982 Portugal -7.653 -1.421 -1.502 0.049 0.054 0.049 0.206
1983 Portugal -2.455 -1.274 -1.489 0.091 0.048 0.054 -0.317 0.054 0.137
1984 Portugal -1.090 -1.122 -1.364 0.104 0.048 0.050 -0.029 0.059 0.100
1985 Portugal -0.108 -0.971 -1.103 0.026 0.046 0.043 0.116 0.066 0.032
1986 Portugal 0.046 -0.826 -0.752 0.027 0.045 0.038 -0.049 0.076 0.083
1987 Portugal -0.262 -0.693 -1.002 -0.024 0.043 0.035 -0.059 0.091 0.235
1988 Portugal 0.383 -0.576 -0.948 -0.043 0.040 0.033 0.109 0.113 0.276
1989 Portugal 0.581 -0.479 -0.874 -0.030 0.038 0.032 0.434 0.141 0.323
1990 Portugal 0.248 -0.404 -0.830 0.075 0.034 0.032 0.407 0.173 0.368
1991 Portugal 0.194 -0.358 -0.765 0.055 0.031 0.033 0.395 0.206 0.415
1992 Portugal -0.568 -0.346 -1.029 0.057 0.029 0.037 0.583 0.234 0.356
1993 Portugal -0.583 -0.375 -1.039 0.122 0.027 0.041 0.512 0.253 0.349
1994 Portugal -0.808 -0.444 -1.046 0.091 0.028 0.043 0.409 0.262 0.333
1995 Portugal -0.810 -0.548 -1.062 0.073 0.034 0.042 0.318 0.263 0.305
1996 Portugal -0.827 -0.677 -1.028 0.033 0.047 0.043 0.250 0.264 0.300
1997 Portugal -1.318 -0.821 -0.994 0.037 0.068 0.044 0.142 0.270 0.296
1998 Portugal -1.115 -0.969 -0.952 0.089 0.097 0.044 0.152 0.283 0.293
1999 Portugal -1.470 -1.111 -0.862 0.168 0.133 0.047 0.275 0.305 0.321
2000 Portugal -1.616 -1.240 -0.805 0.444 0.172 0.048 0.363 0.330 0.338
2001 Portugal -1.359 -1.350 -0.702 0.489 0.213 0.051 0.510 0.356 0.331
2002 Portugal -1.440 -0.641 0.253 0.053 0.378 0.331
2003 Portugal -1.512 -0.562 0.291 0.054 0.396 0.331
2004 Portugal -1.571 -0.531 0.327 0.059 0.409 0.316
2005 Portugal -1.624 -0.549 0.362 0.056 0.418 0.326
1971 Sweden -0.856 -0.936 -0.061 -0.001 0.010 -0.003
1972 Sweden -1.016 -0.929 -0.068 0.000 -0.014 -0.004
1973 Sweden -1.181 -0.913 -0.073 0.000 -0.030 0.005
1974 Sweden -1.348 -0.936 -0.073 0.002 -0.040 0.019
1975 Sweden -1.513 -1.021 -0.070 0.004 -0.043 0.073
1976 Sweden -1.092 -1.670 -1.180 -0.117 -0.064 0.003 -0.120 -0.040 0.046
1977 Sweden -0.861 -1.814 -1.210 -0.133 -0.056 0.004 -0.125 -0.032 0.017
1978 Sweden -0.961 -1.940 -1.408 -0.137 -0.047 0.007 -0.161 -0.022 0.062
1979 Sweden -1.437 -2.048 -1.644 -0.074 -0.037 0.011 -0.023 -0.011 0.056
1980 Sweden -1.477 -2.138 -1.882 -0.058 -0.027 0.016 0.070 0.002 0.070
1981 Sweden -2.492 -2.216 -2.070 -0.065 -0.018 0.020 0.033 0.016 0.105
1982 Sweden -2.010 -2.286 -2.253 -0.037 -0.008 0.024 0.029 0.033 0.105
1983 Sweden -2.379 -2.353 -2.326 -0.032 0.003 0.026 -0.008 0.053 0.061
1984 Sweden -2.878 -2.416 -2.463 -0.017 0.016 0.030 -0.117 0.076 0.058
1985 Sweden -2.368 -2.480 -2.593 0.068 0.031 0.034 0.068 0.100 0.055
1986 Sweden -2.682 -2.546 -2.701 0.039 0.046 0.038 0.090 0.119 0.054
1987 Sweden -3.294 -2.621 -2.897 0.074 0.062 0.043 0.093 0.132 0.040
1988 Sweden -3.769 -2.708 -2.965 0.084 0.077 0.049 0.236 0.138 0.058
1989 Sweden -2.929 -2.805 -3.025 0.085 0.090 0.052 0.332 0.138 0.163
1990 Sweden -2.734 -2.906 -3.171 0.088 0.101 0.047 0.381 0.136 0.260
1991 Sweden -2.918 -3.000 -3.062 0.128 0.108 0.046 0.356 0.133 0.270
1992 Sweden -3.599 -3.079 -2.940 0.217 0.113 0.044 0.104 0.130 0.281
1993 Sweden -3.378 -3.138 -2.208 0.199 0.113 0.039 0.156 0.124 0.202
1994 Sweden -3.461 -3.177 -2.430 0.196 0.109 0.035 0.294 0.114 0.156
1995 Sweden -3.646 -3.199 -2.425 0.098 0.103 0.037 0.327 0.100 0.101
1996 Sweden -2.931 -3.211 -2.394 0.058 0.094 0.041 -0.004 0.084 0.027
1997 Sweden -3.194 -3.216 -2.365 0.071 0.083 0.040 0.046 0.066 0.028
1998 Sweden -2.339 -3.220 -2.477 0.039 0.073 0.037 0.075 0.051 -0.041
1999 Sweden -3.403 -3.224 -2.536 0.034 0.063 0.036 0.007 0.039 -0.078
2000 Sweden -3.340 -3.228 -2.552 0.086 0.055 0.034 0.001 0.031 -0.131
2001 Sweden -3.294 -3.231 -2.550 0.098 0.048 0.035 -0.011 0.026 -0.117
2002 Sweden -3.235 -2.551 0.042 0.036 0.022 -0.101
2003 Sweden -3.238 -2.552 0.038 0.036 0.018 -0.091
2004 Sweden -3.241 -2.553 0.034 0.036 0.015 -0.082
2005 Sweden -3.241 -2.551 0.031 0.036 0.010 -0.082
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.  
Year Country 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1) 10YRW WRW AR(1)
1964 United States -1.093 -0.962 0.170 0.082 0.273 0.183
1965 United States -1.144 -0.964 0.156 0.082 0.224 0.184
1966 United States -1.187 -0.981 0.141 0.082 0.175 0.189
1967 United States -1.219 -1.016 0.126 0.079 0.129 0.151
1968 United States -1.233 -1.045 0.112 0.076 0.088 0.097
1969 United States -1.052 -1.226 -1.066 0.250 0.098 0.074 0.185 0.053 0.053
1970 United States -1.043 -1.196 -1.056 0.216 0.084 0.073 0.037 0.026 0.018
1971 United States -1.431 -1.141 -1.054 0.132 0.072 0.072 -0.076 0.005 -0.020
1972 United States -1.464 -1.064 -1.029 0.129 0.060 0.070 -0.066 -0.010 -0.056
1973 United States -1.426 -0.970 -1.002 0.126 0.049 0.069 -0.040 -0.019 -0.092
1974 United States -1.075 -0.869 -0.981 0.065 0.038 0.067 -0.177 -0.026 -0.102
1975 United States -0.602 -0.771 -0.972 0.018 0.029 0.066 -0.355 -0.030 -0.104
1976 United States -0.378 -0.679 -0.900 0.060 0.024 0.066 -0.412 -0.035 -0.086
1977 United States 0.732 -0.596 -0.827 0.121 0.024 0.066 -0.329 -0.037 -0.085
1978 United States -0.358 -0.529 -0.753 0.055 0.028 0.066 -0.097 -0.035 -0.086
1979 United States -0.215 -0.479 -0.728 0.035 0.034 0.066 -0.083 -0.030 -0.080
1980 United States -0.206 -0.448 -0.720 0.047 0.039 0.065 -0.058 -0.023 -0.073
1981 United States -0.196 -0.432 -0.721 0.058 0.044 0.065 -0.011 -0.014 -0.054
1982 United States -0.297 -0.428 -0.763 0.054 0.049 0.064 0.010 -0.005 -0.020
1983 United States -0.295 -0.433 -0.822 0.074 0.052 0.063 0.010 0.004 0.010
1984 United States -0.453 -0.445 -0.904 0.080 0.056 0.063 0.060 0.012 0.012
1985 United States -0.677 -0.466 -0.973 0.064 0.059 0.063 0.162 0.020 0.012
1986 United States -0.496 -0.498 -1.023 0.048 0.062 0.063 0.101 0.028 0.016
1987 United States -0.480 -0.550 -1.078 0.072 0.066 0.064 -0.037 0.036 0.021
1988 United States -0.663 -0.631 -1.139 0.068 0.070 0.064 0.083 0.042 0.024
1989 United States -1.362 -0.752 -1.208 0.039 0.074 0.065 0.062 0.047 0.030
1990 United States -2.021 -0.920 -1.288 0.043 0.078 0.065 -0.085 0.050 0.033
1991 United States -1.979 -1.139 -1.366 0.084 0.082 0.066 -0.063 0.051 0.034
1992 United States -2.103 -1.398 -1.412 0.111 0.084 0.067 -0.049 0.050 0.048
1993 United States -2.319 -1.674 -1.464 0.102 0.087 0.067 -0.040 0.047 0.052
1994 United States -2.528 -1.934 -1.516 0.101 0.088 0.067 -0.061 0.044 0.046
1995 United States -2.882 -2.145 -1.567 0.114 0.089 0.067 -0.018 0.043 0.040
1996 United States -3.464 -2.286 -1.630 0.092 0.089 0.066 -0.053 0.044 0.033
1997 United States -2.228 -2.352 -1.694 0.089 0.087 0.066 0.159 0.046 0.025
1998 United States -3.044 -2.346 -1.759 0.084 0.083 0.066 0.146 0.047 0.017
1999 United States -2.869 -2.275 -1.822 0.074 0.079 0.066 0.146 0.045 0.016
2000 United States -1.790 -2.148 -1.911 0.054 0.074 0.066 0.079 0.040 0.005
2001 United States -1.833 -1.984 -1.923 0.064 0.070 0.066 0.039 0.032 -0.010
2002 United States -1.807 -1.958 0.065 0.066 0.022 -0.024
2003 United States -1.637 -1.979 0.062 0.066 0.009 -0.030
2004 United States -1.487 -1.987 0.059 0.066 -0.006 -0.029
2005 United States -1.363 -1.986 0.058 0.066 -0.022 -0.030
Procyclicality of public debt Procyclicality of public investment Procyclicality of public consumption
 
Note: the table reports the  it a1  coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the output gap composite 
variable (see equation 1), using various estimation techniques. 10YRW stands for the 10-years 
rolling window OLS method, WRW for the Gaussian-weighted rolling window OLS method and 
AR(1) for the AR(1) MCMC method. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 Appendix 3: Further results for the second stage regressions 
 
Table 1: The effect of public debt procyclicality on growth, 10-years rolling window method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.012 0.006 -0.008 -0.016 -0.032
(0.007)* (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)* (0.008)***
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lag(log (real GDP per -0.002 -0.129 -0.198 -0.246 -0.328
capita)) (0.001)* (0.023)*** (0.021)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)***
0.000 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.005)* (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.003)
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*
Inflation -0.086 -0.166 -0.129 -0.011 -0.011
(0.042)** (0.043)*** (0.036)*** (0.030) (0.036)
Population growth -0.573 -0.428 -1.641 -0.412 -1.135
(0.371) (0.797) (0.433)*** (0.344) (0.381)***
Government share of GDP (in %) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Constant -0.013 -1.252 -1.794 -2.149 -2.781
(0.028) (0.226)*** (0.112)*** (0.225)*** (0.156)***
Observations 385 366 366 366 366
R-squared 0.22 0.46 0.77
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt)
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
Country f.e.
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. Table 2: The effect of public debt procyclicality on growth, 10-years rolling window method, without 
controlling for lag(log(real GDP per capita)) 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003)*** (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.010 -0.002 -0.026 0.004 -0.010
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)** (0.011) (0.009)
-0.001 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)* (0.002)
-0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003)* (0.004) (0.004)
Openness -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.000)
Inflation -0.093 -0.152 -0.104 -0.089 -0.104
(0.043)** (0.045)*** (0.039)*** (0.042)** (0.040)***
Population growth -0.637 -1.081 -2.084 -0.440 -1.130
(0.386)* (0.838) (0.466)*** (0.530) (0.439)**
Government share of GDP (in %) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)***
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)***
Constant 0.015 -0.031 0.012 0.013 -0.039
(0.018) (0.040) (0.019) (0.037) (0.026)
Observations 385 366 366 366 366
R-squared 0.21 0.38 0.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country f.e. Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt)
lag(Procyclicality of government 
debt*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
 Table 3: The effect of public consumption procyclicality on growth, Gaussian-weighted rolling 
window OLS method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.042 -0.060 0.000 -0.046 -0.022
(0.019)** (0.023)*** (0.037) (0.020)** (0.033)
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.011 -0.023 -0.006 -0.024 -0.028
(0.004)** (0.007)*** (0.011) (0.007)*** (0.011)***
0.043 0.050 -0.009 0.040 0.015
(0.022)** (0.024)** (0.042) (0.021)* (0.038)
lag(log (real GDP per -0.001 -0.064 -0.149 -0.111 -0.249
capita)) (0.001)* (0.018)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.030)***
0.000 0.006 0.019 0.004 0.010
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.003) (0.004)***
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)
Inflation -0.087 -0.153 -0.138 -0.049 -0.070
(0.029)*** (0.036)*** (0.030)*** (0.031) (0.029)**
Population growth -0.304 -1.038 -0.678 -0.647 -0.292
(0.295) (0.468)** (0.398)* (0.349)* (0.362)
Government share of GDP (in %) 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)*
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Constant -0.015 -0.566 -1.443 -0.903 -2.024
(0.017) (0.174)*** (0.109)*** (0.186)*** (0.126)***
Observations 453 434 434 434
R-squared 0.14 0.33 0.57
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country year f.e.
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
lag(Procyclicality of government 
consumption*Private credit/GDP)




Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
  
Table 4: The effect of public investment procyclicality on growth, Gaussian-weighted rolling window 
OLS method 
OLS
Standard Corrected for Standard Corrected for
AR(1) errors AR(1) errors
-0.095 -0.055 0.050 -0.064 -0.058
(0.036)*** (0.039) (0.086) (0.033)* (0.141)
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.007 -0.012 0.002 -0.016 -0.015
(0.004)* (0.007)* (0.012) (0.007)** (0.016)
0.098 0.034 -0.102 0.029 -0.046
(0.034)*** (0.032) (0.081) (0.027) (0.125)
lag(log (real GDP per -0.002 -0.074 -0.237 -0.128 -0.638
capita)) (0.001) (0.018)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)*** (0.041)***
0.001 0.005 0.026 0.002 0.005
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.003) (0.006)
Openness 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)
Inflation -0.032 -0.096 -0.123 -0.034 -0.018
(0.020) (0.023)*** (0.030)*** (0.027) (0.026)
Population growth -0.902 -1.303 -0.367 -0.685 0.201
(0.321)*** (0.585)** (0.449) (0.456) (0.399)
Government share of GDP (in %) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)
Investment/GDP (in%) 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Constant -0.008 -0.705 -2.334 -1.123 -5.136
(0.019) (0.176)*** (0.095)*** (0.216)*** (0.063)***
Observations 453 434 434 434 434
R-squared 0.11 0.3 0.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Country f.e. Country year f.e.
lag(Procyclicality of government 
investment)
lag(Procyclicality of government 
investment*Private credit/GDP)
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old
 
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. In columns 3 
and 5, we allowed for AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term by using Stata’s command xtregar, 
which implements the method described in Batalgi (2001).  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1. 
 